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I. INTRODUCTION
U NITED STATES soil first yielded its oil to a well drilled for the
purpose by Colonel' E.L. Drake near Titusville, Pennsylvania,
on August 28, 1859.2 The automobile was first mass-produced in
1913 in Highland Park, Michigan, by Henry Ford. 3 The former
event is recognized as having begun the modern oil and gas industry.4
The latter gave meaning to the former: it assured the oil and gas
industry a future world-wide importance beyond what anyone then
imagined-from both economic and strategic standpoints. 5
More or less standard transactions developed in the oil and gas
industry as demand for its products grew. 6 Although there were end-
1. "Colonel" was apparently a moniker invented by the oil company to impress
the local populace. S. SCHACKNE & N. DRAKE, OI. FOR THE WORLD 33 (2d rev. ed.
1960).
2. 1 J. HENRY, THE EARLY AND LATER HISTORY OF PETROLEUM 91-92 (1873).
Drake's drill broke into an oil-bearing cavity 691/2 feet down just as he quit for the
day on August 28. Id He did not discover the oil until he came back to work the
next day. Id Other United States wells had earlier struck oil, but these discoveries
had been accidents which befell people looking for water. THE DERRICK'S HAND-
BOOK OF PETROLEUM 15 (1898) [hereinafter cited as DERRICK'S]. Nevertheless,
some of these earlier accidental finds had been commercial in quantity, and were
what had drawn Drake to look for oil in the Titusville area. Id
3. A. NEVINS, FORD: THE TIMES, THE MAN, THE COMPANY 469 (1954).
4. E. TIRATSOO, OILFIELDS OF THE WORLD 4 (1973). The use of petroleum
dates back to prehistoric times. DERRICK'S, supra note 2, at 5. Herodotus noted the
phenomenom of oil seeping from a spring on the island of Zante in the fifth century
B.C. Id The first recorded discovery of an oil spring in the United States was by
French missionaries in 1627 near Cuba, New York. Id at 6. Little besides a common
commodity and profit motive united the earlier oil industry with its modern cousin in
the industrial era. In the first half of the nineteenth century, the industry obtained
most of its oil by distilling it from shale and bituminous coal. Id at 14. However,
once Drake showed that it was profitable to drill directly for oil in commercial quan-
tities, these prior businesses all went bankrupt. Id
5. See J. RAE, THE AMERICAN AUTOMOBILE 48-50 (1965); DERRICK'S, supra
note 2, at 15.
6. Domestic crude oil production rose from 60 million barrels in 1900 to 250
million barrels in 1914, largely in order to satisfy the demand created by
automobiles. J. RAE, supra note 5, at 49-50. Between the world wars, the great in-
crease in all forms of oil-burning transportation machinery resulted in corresponding
increases in the demand for petroleum. Frey, World Patterns of Civ'lian Utlization, in
WORLD GEOGRAPHY OF PETROLEUM 354 (1950). The United States' entry into
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less variations on these standard transactions, most were mere embel-
lishments. Occasionally, however, change would rise to the level of
creating an essentially new transaction, which in time would become
another of the industry's standard transactions. Some of these new
transactions were motivated by economics. Others were tax-moti-
vated. Sometimes both motivations were present. To the extent tax
objectives helped shape the changes, the variations often involved cre-
ativity in obtaining for the industry special tax benefits knowingly
conferred by Congress. At other times the new transactions
amounted to little more than abusive manipulation of the taxing
mechanisms.
Congressional desire to stimulate this important sector of the
economy, heightened by effective lobbying, has produced what the
Internal Revenue Service (Service) acknowledges as intentionally
favorable taxation treatment for the oil and gas industry. Moreover,
the industry enjoys other, more broadly-based tax benefits that are
aimed at stimulating the general economy. The capital gains provi-
sions provide one such example. An aspect of capital gains taxation is
the ultimate focus herein.
This article uses a well-known standard industry transaction as
its starting point. It then hypothesizes a new transaction which, when
combined with the standard transaction, raises some important theo-
retical tax issues. These combined transactions will be referred to
herein as the "contemplated" or "proposed transactions."
The standard industry transaction which will serve as a point of
departure for the restructuring discussed herein involves the transfer
of a fractional share of a "working interest"7 to one who will develop
the whole working interest. Gain from cash received up front by the
transferor is treated as capital gain. This is in contrast to a second
type of transaction which will be examined, wherein the entire work-
ing interest is subleased, with the transferor retaining only an "over-
riding royalty interest" 8 instead of a fractional share of the working
interest. In this kind of transaction, cash received up front by the
transferor is treated as ordinary income.
World War II in 1941 also led to rapid domestic growth in oil consumption due to
the increased demand for fuel and distillates from the public sector. Id. at 363. The
growth has continued during the post-war period, with a once minimal foreign con-
sumption now outstripping United States domestic consumption. 15 ACADEMIC
AMERICAN ENCYCLOPEDIA 214 (1981). The 1960's, during which offshore drilling
technology was developed, were particularly significant. Id at 210.
7. For a discussion of working interests, see text accompanying note 26 infra.
8. For a discussion of overriding royalty interests, see text accompanying note 32
tnfra.
10491983-84]
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The purpose of this article is to investigate whether some partici-
pants in a limited partnership can obtain capital gain treatment for
cash received up front in the first of these standard transactions, and
then in a second, new transaction, transform their retained working
interest into an overriding royalty interest without losing capital gain
treatment for the cash received in the initial transaction. The policy
of the Service has been to attack transactions in which this combina-
tion exists.9
The second of the proposed transactions involves a rearrange-
ment of the rights of the limited partners. After this rearrangement
occurs, some limited partners will own "carried working interests,"' 0
while others will own "overriding royalty interests."'I The particular
manner of placing the limited partners in these positions, and its tim-
ing in relation to the standard industry transaction with which it will
be combined, are necessary steps in setting up the hypothetical fact
pattern. The proposed means of accomplishing this rearrangement
appear to be novel; no authority seems to have considered it. It will
therefore be necessary to explore in considerable detail the tax impli-
cations of the rearrangement transaction in its own right. The con-
clusion reached is that the rearrangement transaction is not a
recognition event and therefore gives rise to no tax.
The article will then analyze the tax consequences of combining
the rearrangement with the well-known standard industry transac-
tion noted above. This combination is certainly not common in the
industry and may never have been attempted. The ultimate theoreti-
cal focus of this article is the impact of this hypothetical combination
of transactions on the cash received up front in the first transaction,
when a fractional share of a working interest is transferred to someone
who will develop the whole working interest. Ordinarily, the cash
received in the standard transaction would be capital gain if the rear-
rangement of rights among its recipients were not involved. The con-
clusion reached herein is that it remains capital gain notwithstanding
the rearrangement. No authority supporting or contravening this ul-
timate conclusion has been found.
9. See Rev. Rul. 352, 1969-1 C.B. 34. This ruling provides in pertinent part:
"Accordingly, it is held that . . . the lump-sum payment received by the taxpayer-
grantor of the mineral rights in the instant case, in conjunction with the retention by
him of a royalty interest, is ordinary income and not proceeds from the sale of a
capital asset." Id. at 35. See also A. YOUNG, ARTHUR YOUNG'S OIL AN!) GAS FED-
ERAL INCOME TAXATION 19-4 U. Houghton ed. 1984).
10. For a discussion of carried working interests, see text accompanying note 43
infra.
11. For a discussion of overriding royalty interests, see text accompanying note
32 infra.
1050 [Vol. 29: p. 1047
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II. STRUCTURE OF THE ENTITY
The entity contemplated is, quite simply, a limited partner-
ship. 1 2 The limited partnership will arrange its internal affairs in spe-
cial ways, but such arrangements will not change the nature of the
entity. The general partner is expected to be a developer of mineral
interests and/or a promoter of sales of limited interests in the partner-
ship to the limited partners.
The limited partnership will set up a lease fund. At first, this
fund will be held in the name of the limited partnership. The money
of all partners, general and limited, will be pooled. The limited part-
nership will then use the money to acquire leases either from land-
owners or from prior owners of the leases; hence the name of "lease
fund." Since the limited partners participate in the lease fund
through the limited partnership, they are often called "fund partici-
pants." The general partner is also a participant in the lease fund,
but the focus of this article is on the limited partners. The term "fund
participants," therefore, will primarily refer to the limited partners.
Thus, for the purposes of this article, a flow of cash said to move
through the lease fund to a fund participant refers to a flow through
the limited partnership to a limited partner.
The term "limited partnership lease fund transactions" embodies
the entire set of transactions and activities contemplated, not merely
the acquisition or disposition of a lease.
III. BASIC INDUSTRY TRANSACTIONS
The oil and gas industry models for limited partnership lease
fund transactions follow typical patterns. A person owning all rights
in certain land, including the underlying minerals in place, will trans-
fer rights to the oil and gas in place to the lease fund of a limited
partnership, retaining only a royalty interest.13 The landowner's goal
is to arrange for the exploration and development of oil and gas
under his land without having to expend his time and energies or
bear the high costs and risks of exploration and development,' 4 while
profitting through a royalty interest if oil or gas are found in sufficient
quantities. While the retained royalty interest of the landowner is the
most senior of all royalty interests, it is simply called a "royalty inter-
12. For a discussion of the use of limited partnerships in the oil and gas industry,
see A. BRUEN & W. TAYLOR, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF OIL AND GAS IN-
VESTMENTS 1.05 (1983).
13. See A. YOUNG, supra note 9, 1 3-1.
14. See A. BRUEN & W. TAYLOR, supra note 12, 8.03, at 8-80.
1983-84] 1051
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est"' or a "landowner's royalty."' 6 It is not called an "overriding
royalty interest,"' 7 a term curiously reserved for a subordinate posi-
tion described below.' 8 This transaction is considered a lease.19
Since the transaction is a lease rather than a sale, income to the
landowner from the lease is treated as ordinary income, not capital
gain, for purposes of federal income tax law. 20 It is common for the
landowner to receive at the outset a lump-sum cash payment which is
15. F. BURKE & R. BOWHAY, INCOME TAXATION OF NATURAl. RESOURCES
3.01, at 301 (1983); A. YOUNG, supra note 9,$ 11-1. Seealso A. BRUEN & W. TAN'-
LOR, supra note 12, $ 8.03. Cf F. BURKE & R. BOWHAY, supra, 2.05. A royalty
interest, or simply a royalty, is a share or right to a portion of the oil and/or gas
produced, although frequently it will be used to denote a right to proceeds, since cash
is the usual form of a royalty payment. 3 E. KUNTZ, Oi. ANI) GAS § 42.2 (1967).
16. See A. YOUNG, supra note 9, 11 11-1, -14; see also RESEARCH INST. OF AM.,
FEDERAL. TAX COORDINATOR 21) $ N-4402, at 38,263 (1984) [hereinafter cited as
R.I.A.].
17. See A. BRUEN & W. TAYIOR, supra note 12, 8.03; A. YOUNG, supra note 9,
11-1. See also F. BURKE & R. BOWHAY, supra note 15, $ 2.05.
18. For a discussion of an overriding royalty interest, see text accompanying
note 32 tifra.
19. Commissioner v. P.G. Lake, Inc., 356 U.S. 260, 261 n.l (1958). Bruen and
Taylor state: "The Service has ruled that whenever the transferor of an operating
interest retains a royalty interest in the property, the transaction is to be treated for
tax purposes as a lease." A. BRUEN & W. TAYI.OR, supra note 12, 8.03, at 8-8; see 1d.
$ 8.04, at 8-16 to -17; F. BURKE & R. BOWHAY, supra note 15, T$ 3.02, 4.02 (a royalty
interest is a non-operating or non-working interest); R.I.A., supra note 16, N-4104;
A. YOUNG, supra note 9, 11 13-1, 18-1, 19-4; Rev. Rul. 352, 1969-1 C.B. 34. See also
Jahn v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 452, 455 (1972), aff'dmem., 475 F.2d 1140 (6th Cir.
1973) (a lump-sum payment by drillers to landowners at the commencement of a
lease constitutes a bonus or advance royalty and therefore is ordinary income). Cf
Palmer v. Bender, 287 U.S. 551 (1933) (depletion allowances not confined to those
who are technically lessors). See generally A. YOUNG, supra note 9, $$ 2-16, 19-2 (a
sublease is a lease for purposes of economics and federal taxation law) (citing G.C.M.
22730, 1941-1 C.B. 214; Rev. Rul. 467, 1969-2 C.B. 142).
While similarities exist between the lease described and a lease for property law
purposes, and while it is certainly natural to think in property law terms, the term
"lease" as used here does not imply a landlord and tenant relationship nor any analo-
gous relationship. See Norvell, Negotiating and Drafting the Oil and Gas Lease for the Agri-
cultural Landowner, 3 AGRIC. L.J. 627, 627 (1981-82).
Transactions directly between the landowner and the lease fund are known in
the industry, but it is typical for the lease fund to acquire the lease from an oil and
gas company which previously dealt with the landowner. A. WII.IS, J. PENNEI.. &
P. POSTLEWAITE, PARTNERSHIP TAXATION § 194.03 (3d ed. 1983). Direct acquisi-
tion from the landowner is the route used here since it more clearly conveys an un-
derstanding of the relative positions of the essential parties.
20. See, e.g., United States v. White, 401 F.2d 610 (10th Cir. 1968) (deed convey-
ing uranium for a lump sum payment together with a 10% royalty of gross profits
held to constitute a lease, with the royalty payments taxable as ordinary income, not
as long term capital gains); accord Hartman Tobacco Co. v. United States, 471 F.2d
1327 (1973). See also F. BURKE & R. BOWHAY, supra note 15, 4.03, at 404; R.I.A.,
supra note 16, N-4021; A. YOUNG, supra note 9, 11 18-1, 19-4. The significance of
classifying income as either ordinary income or capital gain is discussed in Part VI,
Policy Dimensions, infra.
1052 [Vol. 29: p. 1047
6
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 5 [1984], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol29/iss5/1
1983-84] OIL AND GAS LEASE TRANSACTION 1053
not pledged to development. 2' Such a lump-sum payment is in the
nature of an advance royalty,22 and thus is taxed as ordinary in-
come.23 In economic terms, it is a bonus 24 paid to the landowner for
entering into the lease and is typically referred to as "lease bonus
income. "25
21. See F. BURKE & R. BOWHAY, supra note 15, $ 4.02; A. YOUNG, supra note 9,
13-1, at 190.
22. See Anderson v. Helvering, 310 U.S. 404, 409 (1940); Jahn v. Commissioner,
58 T.C. 452, 455 (1972), aff'd mem., 475 F.2d 1140 (6th Cir. 1973); G.C.M. 22730,
1941-1 C.B. 214, 217. See also A. BRUEN & W. TAYLOR, supra note 12, 8.03[2]; F.
BURKE & R. BOWHAY, supra note 15, $T 4.02, 4.03, at 404; R.I.A. supra note 16, T N-
4552; A. YOUNG, supra note 9, $T 11-4, 18-5. But see Clark v. United States, 587 F.2d
465 (10th Cir. 1978); Lambert v. Jefferson Lake Sulphur Co., 236 F.2d 542 (5th Cir.
1956); Daney v. United States, 247 F. Supp. 533 (D. Kan. 1965), a#'d, 370 F.2d 791
(10th Cir. 1966). Cf Commissioner v. Engle, 104 S. Ct. 597 (1984) (depletion allow-
ance may be allowed as an advance royalty). For a different purpose, the Treasury
Department distinguishes between a bonus and an advance royalty. See Treas. Reg.
§ 1.612-3(a), (b), T.D. 7523, 1978-1 C.B. 192. It is not comtemplated that the cash is
pledged to development. If it were, the results would be different. For a discussion of
the nature of a royalty, see note 24 and accompanying text tnfra.
23. Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103 (1932) (even though the lease was regarded
by state law as a sale of oil and gas in place, it was taxed as ordinary income under
federal law); G.C.M. 22730, 1941-1 C.B. 224; Rev. Rul. 352, 1969-1 C.B. 34; Rev.
Rul. 120, 1963-1 C.B. 141; F. BURKE and R. BOWHAY, supra note 15, 19 3.01, 4.03, at
404; R.I.A., supra note 16, $ N-4552. Accord Commissioner v. Pickard, 401 F.2d 615
(10th Cir. 1968); United States v. White, 401 F.2d 610 (10th Cir. 1968); R.I.A., supra
note 16, $ N-4550. See also A. BRUEN & W. TAYLOR, supra note 12, $ 8.03[2]; A.
YOUNG, supra note 9, T$ 18-1, 18-5. For a discussion of the ordinary character of an
advance payment, see Jahn v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 452, 455 (1972), aff"dmem., 475
F.2d 1140 (6th Cir. 1973); R.I.A., supra note 16, 9 N-4550.
24. See, e.g., Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103, 104 (1932); United States v. White,
401 F.2d 610, 611 (10th Cir. 1968); Jahn v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 452, 454 (1972),
ajdmem., 475 F.2d 1140 (6th Cir. 1973). See also A. BRUEN & W. TAYLOR, supra note
12, $$ 3.03[1], 8.03[2]; F. BURKE & R. BOWHAY, supra note 15, $T 3.01, 4.02, 4.03; A.
YOUNG, supra note 9, $ 18-1; G.C.M. 22730, 1941-1 C.B. 224. Although a potential
theoretical ground for distinguishing between a bonus and an advance royalty would
not change the tax character or treatment of the lump sum payment under discus-
sion, it does exist. The conceptual basis on which to draw the distinction is that a
bonus paid at the outset does not depend on production for its existence, either cur-
rently or later; a royalty commonly does. In oil and gas matters the dependency of
the royalty payment on production seems to be at the heart of the definition of the
word "royalty." The initial bonus, while closely akin to an early payment of a roy-
alty, does not depend on present production, is not repaid if future production were
to fail, and need not be (and typically is not) credited against what future production
there is. An advance royalty, unlike a minimum royalty, is also not creditable
against a royalty due on future production. A. BRUEN & W. TAYLOR, supra note 12,
9 3.03[1]. The text discussion follows conventional industry usage of the terms.
25. See, e.g., Glass v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 949 (1981); F. BURKE & R.
BOWHAY, supra note 15, $$ 3.01, 4.02, 4.03. Percentage depletion under the exemp-
tion for independent producers and royalty owners will not be available to the land-
owner with respect to the lease bonus income, even though it is a royalty, unless
production occurs in the year of receipt. Glass, 76 T.C. at 952; see I.R.C. § 613(a), (c)
(1982); Rev. Rul. 44, 1981-1 C.B. 384. This is true even when there is production in
the year of payment if the payment had not been contingent upon production.
Farmar v. United States, 689 F.2d 1017 (Ct. Cl. 1982), rev'don othergrounds, 104 S. Ct.
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After the landowner has transferred the mineral rights, the par-
ticipants of the limited partnership lease fund will hold the right to
develop or "work" the oil and gas deposits. Their interest is accord-
ingly called a "working interest."'26 They have the right to receive the
profits from their working interest, after payment of the landowner's
royalty.
What has happened so far is that the landowner has succeeded in
arranging for the lease fund to pay 100% of the costs of exploring for
and developing any oil or gas under his land.2 7 However, the fund
participants may entertain mixed feelings about undertaking the risks
of bearing all of the exploration and development costs. If so, they
may seek to have others bear all or a portion of these costs. 2 8 Were
the fund participants to transfer the entire working interest, retaining
only a royalty interest, the transaction would be similar to that be-
tween the landowner and the fund participants: 29 it would be a sub-
lease. 30 The transferee in this situation is often a driller,3 1 who would
then own the entire working interest. The fund participants' royalty
597 (1984). Only cost depletion may be taken. Rev. Rul. 76-34, 1976-1 C.B. 177. See
Treas. Reg. § 1.612-3(a)(2), (b)(2), T.D. 7523, 1978-1 C.B. 192. But see Herring v.
Commissioner, 293 U.S. 322 (1934); Engle v. Commissioner, 677 F.2d 594 (7th Cir.
1982), rev'g76 T.C. 915 (1981). If the Engle continuation of the Herring case holds up,
any percentage depletion taken may be subject to recapture if production is never
attained. Douglas v. Commissioner, 322 U.S. 75 (1944).
26. Commissioner v. P.G. Lake, Inc., 356 U.S. 260, 261 n.l (1958); R.I.A., supra
note 16, T N-4301, at 38,261; A. YOUNG, supra note 9, 1 13-1. Some authorities refer
to "working interests" as "operating interests." See A. BRUEN & W. TAYI.OR, supra
note 12, 2.01. The terms are often used interchangeably. See, e.g., Treas. Reg.
§ 1.614-1(a)(2), T.D. 7261, 1973-1 C.B. 309; F. BURKE & R. BOWHAY, supra note 15,
1 2.04; R.I.A., supra note 16, 11 N-4020, -4210; A. YOUNG, supra note 9, $ 13-1. "Op-
erating mineral interest" is the term adopted by the Internal Revenue Code and
Regulations. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 614(b), (d) (1982); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.614-0, 1.614-2,
1.614-8 (1983). Normally the term "working interest" is used with reference to oil
and gas interests and the term "operating interest" is used with reference to other
mineral interests. F. BURKE & W. BOWHAY, supra note 15, $ 2.04, at 203.
27. The obligation of the fund to arrange for the exploration for oil and gas and
to develop the property if the oil or gas is present in economic quantities is not usu-
ally an absolute obligation. The landowner's grant of the working interest is nor-
mally for a fixed term, within which the exploration and development must be
undertaken. A. YOUNG, supra note 9, 1 13-1. If the obligation were not met, the lease
would simply lapse. Id If the obligation were met, and if oil or gas were found, the
lease would continue for the life of the deposit. Id
28. See A. BRUEN & W. TAYLOR, supra note 12, 8.03[3]; F. BURKE & R.
BOWHAY, supra note 15, $ 2.04, at 203.
29. See G.C.M. 22730, 1941-1 C.B. 214; A. BRUEN & W. TAYI.OR, supra note 12,
1 8.03, at 8-8. See also F. BURKE & R. BOWHAY, supra note 15, 1 3.01.
30. Commissioner v. P.G. Lake, Inc., 356 U.S. 260, 261 n.1 (1958); Cox v.
United States, 497 F.2d 348 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1047 (1974); West v.
Commissioner, 150 F.2d 723 (5th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 795 (1946); Hogan
v. Commissioner, 141 F.2d 92 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 710 (1944); McLean v.
Commissioner, 120 F.2d 942 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 670 (1941); Louisiana
1054 [Vol. 29: p. 1047
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interest overrides the rights of the third-party transferee. Accord-
ingly, it is called an "overriding royalty interest. '32
The royalties received by fund participants are taxed as ordinary
income,3 3 any cash paid to them at the outset being treated the same
as the initial cash paid to the landowner. 34 Up front payments, which
are not pledged to development, are common. 35 In economic terms,
the advance royalty 36 is a bonus3 7 paid to the fund participants on
entering into the sublease and is accordingly referred to as "sublease
bonus income."' 38 After the transfer, the driller becomes responsible
for payment of all costs of exploration and development. 39 Because
the working interest is essentially farmed out for development to the
Land & Exploration Co. v. Commissioner, 6 T.C. 172 (1946). See genera//y A. BRUEN
& W. TAYLOR, supra note 12, § 8.03; A. YOUNG, supra note 9, 11-15.
31. The driller is typically the oil and gas company from which the lease was
acquired. Wiii.Is, supra note 19, § 194.03.
32. See A. BRUEN & W. TAYLOR, supra note 12, 1 8.03; F. BURKE & R. BOWHAY,
supra note 15, 1 2.05; R.I.A., supra note 16, 1 N-4402; A. YOUNG, supra note 9, $ 11-14.
One case addressed whether the term "royalty," as used in the Treasury regulations,
includes an overriding royalty, and decided in the affirmative. Aven v. United
States, 78-2 U.S.T.C. 9729 (W.D. Okla. 1978) (interpreting Treas. Reg. § 1-612-
3(b), T.D. 7523, 1978-1 C.B. 192).
33. See Palmer v. Bender, 287 U.S. 551 (1933); Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103
(1932); Cox v. United States, 497 F.2d 348 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1047
(1974); United States v. White, 401 F.2d 610 (10th Cir. 1968); Rev. Rul. 120, 1963-1
C.B. 141; R.I.A., supra note 16, N-4552. See also A. BRUEN & W. TAYLOR, supra
note 12, 1 8.0311] (proceeds of a lease receive ordinary income treatment). For fur-
ther discussion, see note 23 and accompanying text supra.
34. See Cox v. United States, 497 F.2d 348 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1047
(1974); G.C.M. 22730, 1941-1 C.B. 214, 224; Hogan v. Commissioner, 141 F.2d 92
(5th Cir.), cerl. dented, 323 U.S. 710 (1944); McLean v. Commissioner, 120 F.2d 942
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 670; Treas. Reg. § 1.613A-3(a)(4), examples 5, 7(f)
(proposed 1977). See also F. BURKE & R. BOWHAY, supra note 15, 11 3.01, 4.03, 7.16;
A. YOUNG, supra note 9, 11 18-5, 19-4. Cf Palmer v. Bender, 287 U.S. 551 (1933);
Heep Oil Corp. v. United States, 32 F. Supp. 762 (Ct. Cl. 1940); Cockburn v. Com-
missioner, 16 T.C. 775 (1951); Hartman Tobacco Co. v. United States, 471 F.2d 1307
(2d Cir. 1973).
35. See note 21 supra.
36. See West v. Commissioner, 150 F.2d 723 (5th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S.
795 (1946); Hogan v. Commissioner, 141 F.2d 92 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 710
(1944); A. YOUNG, supra note 9, T$ 11-4, 18-5. See also A. BRUEN & W. TAYI.OR, supra
note 12, 1 8.03[21; F. BURKE & R. BOWHAY, supra note 15, 11 4.02, 4.03.
37. See West v. Commissioner, 3 T.C. 431, 447 (1944), affi'd 150 F.2d 723 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 795 (1945). See also A. BRUEN & W. TAYLOR, supra note 12,
11 3.03[1], 8.03[2], 8.03[3]; F. BURKE & R. BOWHAY, supra note 15, 11 3.01, 4.03,
7.16; A. YOUNG, supra note 9, 1 18-1; G.C.M. 22730, 1941-1 C.B. 214, 224.
38. See general/y F. BURKE & R. BOWHAY, supra note 15, 3.01. The retention of
a royalty interest only, which is a nonoperating or nonworking interest, is a lease. Id
11 3.02, 4.01. For a discussion of the limitation of available depletion with respect to
the sublease bonus income, see note 25 and accompanying text supra.
39. A. YOUNG, supra note 9, 13-1. The driller's obligation to arrange for explo-
ration and development is not absolute. It is subject to the same types of contingen-
cies as those discussed in note 27 supra.
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driller, this transaction is commonly called a "farmout. ' '40
Alternatively and very typically, however, fund participants will
wish to retain the right to a share of proceeds that is greater than just
an overriding royalty interest. In that case, they will continue their
original undertaking concerning payment of costs, but only as to a
portion of those costs. The driller in this situation undertakes to pay
the rest of the costs, and in return, becomes entitled to a share of the
proceeds. The driller's share depends on that of the fund partici-
pants: the larger the share of proceeds they keep, the larger their
share of costs, and thus the smaller the driller's share of costs and
proceeds. The continuing liability of the fund participants for a por-
tion of the costs means their interest is still a working interest. 41
Although the driller could simply acquire a portion of the work-
ing interest of the fund participants, thereby placing himself in the
same position as the participants, it is more common to further divide
responsibility to pay costs. The additional dimension of this division
relates to timing. Commonly, the driller will undertake to pay 100%
of the costs during the period of time prior to the "casing" point.42
After the casing point is reached, the driller and the fund participants
will share costs. By paying all the costs up to the casing point, the
driller carries the fund participants to the "casing" point. The inter-
est of the fund participants is therefore called a "carried working in-
terest."'43 Concomitantly, the driller's interest is referred to as a
40. See A. BRUEN & W. TAYLOR, supra note 12, 8.03[3]; F. BURKE & R.
BOWHAY, supra note 15, 2.04, at 204. The fund participants are the farmors. The
farmout concept applies with equal force to the lease with the landowner, wherein
the fund participants are the farmees. However, the term "farmout" does not nor-
mally appear to be used in this concept. Its normal usage seems to be in transactions
entered into by persons owning a working interest where the working interest has
already been severed from the fee. The working interest owned by the landowner
before he enters into the lease is an interest included within the fee. In a farmout,
part or all of the working interest is assigned to a farmee who undertakes part or all of
the costs of developing the property. See A. BRUEN & W. TAYLOR, supra note 12,
8.0313], at 8-13; F. BURKE & R. BOWHAY, supra note 15, 7.02.
41. See I.R.C. § 614(d); Treas. Reg. § 1.614-2(b), T.D. 6859. 1965-2 C.B. 185; A.
YOUNG, supra note 9, 13-1.
42. "Casing" point is the depth at which the operator believes, on the basis of
geological evaluation, that hydrocarbons may be found. In other words, casing point
is the depth to which the operator has obligated itself to drill. When the casing point
is reached, the well is tested for the presence of hydrocarbons, usually by an elec-
tronic induction log. This log furnishes information on the basis of which a decision
is made whether to complete the well. If the logs do not justify completion, the well
is a "dry hole," which is then plugged and abandoned. See Brountas v. Commis-
sioner, 73 T.C. 491, 500 (1979), rev'don other grounds, 692 F.2d 152 (1st Cir. 1982). The
casing point is chosen before drilling begins and is usually near the midpoint of the
stratum in which oil is thought to lie. To the extent oil is found at all, it is not
uncommon to find it before the casing point is reached.
43. SeeA. BRUEN & W. TAYLOR, supra note 12, $ 3.05121(d)(iv); F. BURKE & W.
1056 [Vol. 29: p. 1047
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"carrying working interest."'44 The continuing liability of the fund
participants for a portion of the costs after the casing point means
that their interest is still a working interest. 45 This transaction is also
called a "farmout." 46
In this kind of farmout, the driller is liable for all costs attributa-
ble to his share of the working interest. However, he has the right to
recoup those costs attributable to the carried working interest, but
only out of the share of proceeds to which the owners of the carried
working interest are entitled. Excepting this right of recoupment, the
two interests become the same at the casing point; the only remaining
differences between them relate to the share of proceeds to which
each is entitled and the share of costs for which each is responsible.
When the fund participants thus remain at risk by retaining
more than an overriding royalty interest, they are transferring abso-
lutely a portion of what they had, rather than placing the driller in a
subordinate position. Under general, traditional analysis the transfer
seems less like a lease and more like a sale or exchange of either a
capital asset or property used in a trade or business. Such a sale or
exchange would, of course, produce capital gain rather than ordinary
income.47 However, principles of general applicability have not al-
ways been followed for the oil and gas industry. Special characteris-
tics of the industry, combined with a peculiar history of the
development of applicable law, have complicated the classification of
this transaction.
If the fund participants transferred absolutely all of their work-
ing interest for cash, the proper classification of the transaction would
follow the general traditional analysis. It would be a sale.48 And be-
BOWHAY, supra note 15, 2.08; R.I.A., supra note 16, 7 N-4301, at 38,261, N-4205 at
38,255; A. YOUNG, supra note 9, $ 16-1.
44. For a list of authorities on carrying working interests, see note 43 supra.
45. For a definition of a working interest, see A. YOUNG, supra note 9, $ 13-1. A
working interest is sometimes referred to as an operating interest. Id For definitions
of an operating mineral interest, see I.R.C. § 614(d) (1982); Treas. Reg. § 1.614-2(d),
T.D. 6859, 1965-2 C.B. 185.
46. For a definition of a farmout, see A. BRUEN & W. TAYI.OR, supra note 12,
8.03[3], 8.04 n.59; F. BURKE & R. BOWHAY, supra note 15, 7.02. For a descrip-
tion of other types of sharing arrangements, see A. BRUEN & W. TAYI.OR, supra note
12, $ 8.04.
47. See A. BRUEN & W. TAYLOR, supra note 12, 8.03. For a further discussion
of income characterization, see note 113 and accompanying text 1 fra. Whenever
capital gain is discussed herein as an outcome or a potential outcome, it is assumed
that the applicable holding period necessary for long-term capital gain treatment has
been met.
48. See A. BRUEN & W. TAYLOR, supra note 12, 8.0313]; F. BURKE & R.
BowHAV, supra note 15, 3.03. For a discussion of the tax consequences of classifica-
tion as a sale, see A. BRU-N & W. TAYI.OR, supra note 12, 8.04.
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cause a capital gain asset 49 is involved, the gain would be taxed as
capital gain rather than ordinary income. 50
In contrast, if the fund participants transferred absolutely only a
49. "Capital gain asset" is used herein to refer to assets, the sale of which pro-
duces capital gain regardless of whether the asset is a capital asset, or a § 1231 asset.
For a discussion of capital assets, see note 135 and accompanying text t'nfra.
50. G.C.M. 22730, 1941-1 C.B. 214. See Urschel v. Jones, 83 F. Supp. 600, 609
(W.D. Okla.), app., dtsmissed per stipulation, 178 F.2d 663 (10th Cir. 1949); Engle v.
Commissioner, 13 T.C.M. (CCH) 520, 526 (1954); Robinson v. Commissioner, 13
T.C.M. (CCH) 921, 925 (1954); F. BURKF & R. BOWHAY, supra note 15, 3.03. Cf
Commissioner v. P.G. Lake, Inc., 356 U.S. 260, 266 n.5 (1958) (quoting in dictum
that the Commissioner's view that assignment for gain of an in-oil payment right
which extends "over a period of less than the life of the depletable property interest
from which it is carved" should be treated as ordinary income does not apply where
the entire depletable interest or fractional share assigned extends "over the entire life
of the property") (citing I.T. 4003, 1950-1 C.B. 10, 11). However, in this standard
transaction, a fractional share of a working interest, also a depletable interest, is
transferred for the entire life of the working interest. See also Bailey v. Commissioner,
21 T.C. 678, 686 (1954).
Since these cases are both illustrative of and crucial to this article's thesis, it may
be useful to carefully explore the facts of each case so as to better compare them with
the transactions proposed herein.
Urschelwas decided under old I.R.C. § 117, the equivalent capital gain provision
of the 1939 Code, and involved years prior to the 1939 codification. 83 F. Supp. at
601. Directly and indirectly, substantial working interests in both producing leases
and undeveloped leases were sold before death by a predecessor in interest. Id at
602. This sale occurred in 1929, and the decedent parted with all his interest in the
producing leases, but with only an undivided half interest in the undeveloped leases.
Id. Decedent was not a dealer in leases and did not acquire them for purposes of sale.
The purchaser was to develop and operate the undeveloped leases for the benefit of
itself and the decedent. Id. Decedent also parted with other valuable properties in
the sale. Id. at 603. He received $27,500,000 cash up front plus a contingent right to
receive $6,000,000 more, when and if production from all of the transferred leases
exceeded $30,000,000. Id. In 1936, the decedent's successors in interest sold a one-
half interest in the contingent obligation, together with other valuable properties to
the Transwestern Oil Company. Id. at 604. In 1941, they sold the other one-half
interest in the contingent obligation to the same corporation. Id At issue was the
proper treatment of the proceeds from the 1941 sale.
The Commissioner argued that the 1941 sale was not the sale of a capital asset
but rather the "collection of a one-half interest in a contingent account receivable."
Id. at 607. The court held that the sale involved a capital asset which, having been
held for longer than the two year requisite holding period, produced long-term capi-
tal gain. Id at 609. This conclusion seems necessarily predicated on the view that
what was sold to create the contingent obligation was itself a capital asset, although
the court did not so state, and did indicate that the contingent obligation was not an
economic interest in the leases. Id This, in turn, leads to the conclusion that the cash
received up front also produced capital gain, although this was not an issue in the
case. The court did indicate, however, that decedent reported the cash as capital
gain in 1929 and that the Commissioner had accepted this treatment. Id. at 603.
Robinson was also decided under old I.R.C. § 117 of the 1939 Code, and involved
the sale of three oil and gas leases. 13 T.C.M. (CCH) at 922-23. These leases were
not producing current income for the taxpayer and it appears they were unproven.
Id. at 922. The taxpayer owned several other leases and over a period of years sold
many interests, but normally to a select group of business associates. Id The three
sales at issue were to these business associates. Id. at 923. The sales were precipitated
12
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fraction of their working interest in exchange for cash or other prop-
erty pledged to development by the driller, then the transaction
would be classified as neither a lease5 l nor a sale. 52 It would be a
sharing arrangement 53 in which no gain or loss would be recog-
nized. 54 The form of the driller's contribution, whether it be in cash,
by the taxpayer's need for cash in order to cover his share of costs for an unrelated
well. Id.
The Commissioner claimed that the leases sold were property held primarily for
sale in the ordinary course of a trade or business due to the number of sales the
taxpayer made over a long period of time. d at 922. The court found, however,
that the leases were held for investment and allowed long-term capital gain treat-
ment. Id. at 925. It is not clear whether the sales at issue involved whole leaseholds
or fractional shares. It does seem, however, that the taxpayer parted with all of
whatever interest he had in the particular leases. The case is partially distinguishable
in that the sales did not contemplate that either seller or buyer would undertake
development of the leases sold. The case does, however, support the proposition that
the sale of a working interest produces gain which will be treated as long-term capital
gain when held for longer than the requisite holding period. 13 T.C.M. at 925.
Engle was also decided under old I.R.C. § 117 of the Code. 13 T.C.M. (CCH) at
520. In Engle, numerous fractional interests in oil and gas leases were sold. Id at 521.
The taxpayer never solicited sales, however, and normally held on to his interests for
profits from development and production. Id. at 520-21. The Commissioner's effort
to treat the taxpayer as a dealer due to the number of sales and the time over which
they were made was unsuccessful. 1d at 526. No argument was made that the frac-
tional shares were not other property whose sale at a gain after the requisite six
months holding period would result in long-term capital gain. Thus, long-term capi-
tal gain treatment followed. Id. The case is partially distinguishable in that the in-
terests transferred were of producing properties and any further development of the
working interests would not be done by the transferees. Id at 522. However, the
transferees were liable on a continuing basis to pay a share of costs. Id. at 523. The
case can therefore be seen as mandating long-term capital gain treatment for the sale
of a fractional share of a working interest, although a carried arrangement was not
involved.
In Bailey, the taxpayer transferred fractional shares of oil and gas leases for cash.
21 T.C. at 681. The transferor used the cash for development of wells, rather than
requiring the transferee to undertake development. Id Under the equivalent provi-
sion of § 117 of the 1939 Code, long-term capital gain treatment was accorded to
gain realized from the transfers of property held for more than the requisite six
months. Id at 686. An unsuccessful attack by the Service was grounded solely on the
claim that the taxpayer was a dealer, and that he was holding the interests for sale in
the ordinary course of his trade or business. Id This claim rested on the large
number of sales and the time over which they were made. Id. No argument was
made that the fractional shares were not otherwise property whose sale at a gain after
the requisite holding period would result in long-term capital gain. The case is some-
what distinguishable, however, for two reasons: first, the transferor used the cash for
development, rather than contemplating that the transferees would undertake devel-
opment; second, there seems to have been no continuing responsibility for some trans-
ferees to pay a share of costs.
51. F. BURKE & R. BOWHAY, supra note 15, 3.05, at 304.
52. See A. BRUEN & W. TAYLOR, supra note 12, $ 8.03[3]; F. BURKE & R.
BOWHAY, supra note 12, 3.05.
53. See G.C.M. 22730, 1941-1 C.B. 214; A. BRUEN & W. TAYI.OR, supra note 12,
8.03[4]; F. BURKE & R. BOWHAY, supra note 15, $ 3.05, 7.01, 7.09. Although the
concept is very old, the sharing arrangement has not been the subject of any case.
54. A. BRUEN & W. TAYLoR, supra note 12, 8.0313], [4]; F. BURKE & R.
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other property, or services, would be irrelevant as long as the contri-
bution is pledged to, and ultimately used for, development.
Authorities agree that the sharing arrangement is a nontaxable
occurrence. 55 They are not consistent, however, in their reasons for
this result. Disagreement centers on the nature of the transaction.
Under one view, the transaction is nontaxable because it is not an
exchange. 56 It is considered a sharing, or pooling together, similar to
the joining of assets which occurs when a partnership or joint venture
is formed.57 This'does not mean that the transaction is a partnership
or joint venture because the requisite characteristics of those business
forms other than sharing or pooling are not present. 58 Under this
view, lack of an exchange means that neither party has realized any-
thing.59 Because no realization has occurred, there is nothing to rec-
ognize under the current policy of not taxing mere appreciation. 0
This "no exchange" characterization, however, is a legal fiction,
although it is one that is completely compatible with tax treatment of
other situations involving the coming together of different parties to
share or pool their resources for mutual profit. 61
Under a second view, an exchange is said to occur, but the trans-
action is still considered nontaxable. An exchange occurs because the
parties are transferring rights: the fund participants transfer to the
driller a fraction of their working interest in property; 62 in exchange,
the driller agrees to make a contribution in the form of development,
receiving an interest in the property in return.63 This second view,
which sees an exchange, denies the taxability of any gain realized in
that exhange based on economic or social policy considerations,
rather than on the theory of taxation. 64 While creating some theoreti-
BOWHAY, supra note 15, 3.01, 7.04, 7.19. See also I.R.C. § 636 (1982) (income tax
treatment of mineral production payments).
55. See F. BURKE & R. BOWHAY, supra note 15, 1 7.04.
56. Id. 3.01, .03.
57. Id. 7.04.
58. Id
59. Id
60. See Detroit Edison Co. v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 98 (1943); Rogan v. Blue
Ridge Oil Co., 83 F.2d 420 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 574 (1936); Thompson v.
Commissioner, 28 F.2d 247 (3rd Cir. 1928); G.C.M. 22730, 1941-1 C.B. 214; F.
BURKE & R. BOWHAY, supra note 15, $ 7.04. The transferor is thought to have no
benefit other than the mere unrealized appreciation which the transferee's contribu-
tion represents. F. BURKE & R. BOWHAY, supra note 15, $ 7.04.
61. For a discussion of these other situations, see text accompanying notes 56-60
supra.
62. See F. BURKE & R. BowIIAY, supra note 15, T 7.08.
63. Id 17.01. See also G.C.M. 22730, 1941-1 C.B. 214.
64. Incorporation by more than one party, creation of partnerships, and joint
ventures are all examples of nontaxable exchanges. Justifying nontaxation in all
1060 [Vol. 29: p. 1047
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cal difficulties, the second view better describes reality. Situations
like the sharing arrangement involve a coming together and an ex-
change of property rights, but they do not involve parties who then
go their separate ways, leaving behind the property rights they trans-
ferred and taking with them the property rights they received.65 In
one respect, the sharing arrangement is more akin to the joint ven-
ture, since each party to a sharing arrangement retains separate own-
ership of some of the assets he brought to the arrangement. For
example, the driller continues to own the drilling rig. However, since
the interests of the fund participants and the driller are fractional
interests in the whole of the working interest, the sharing arrange-
ment in this respect is much like a corporate or partnership arrange-
ment in which, albeit through the intervening entity, the parties own
undivided interests in the whole of the underlying assets. Tenancy in
common would be a property law equivalent.
Unlike the above analogies, however, the transactions contem-
plated herein include an additional element-cash not pledged to de-
velopment. This is cash transferred up front by the driller to the fund
participants. Like a sharing arrangement, the fund participants
transfer absolutely only a portion of their working interest to the
driller. But unlike a sharing arrangement, the driller also pays a cash
bonus to the fund participants and agrees to make contributions to
the development of the property. The contemplated transaction as a
whole, therefore, does not fit the general traditional analysis of a sale.
Neither does it fit the sharing arrangement concept. It is mixed, 66
with characteristics of both a sale and a sharing arrangement. 67 Be-
cause the transaction is divisible into its constituent parts,68 it is re-
ferred to as a "divisible sharing arrangement."6 9 Each part is treated
these situations may be a policy favoring the tax-free joining of capital to stimulate
economic efficiency, capital formation and job creation. Nontaxation of sharing or
pooling is sometimes referred to as the "pool of capital doctrine."
65. An example of the latter transaction would be a § 351 transfer where the
taxpayer transferred property to a newly organized corporation, and received stock
in exchange. See I.R.C. § 351 (1982).
66. See F. BURKE & R. BOWHAY, supra note 15, 7.04, .06.
67. Id. 7.06, .19.
68. d. 7.01, .06, .19.
69. Id 7.01, .19. The concepts of a sharing arrangement as a nonrecognition
event and a divisible sharing arrangement as a partial nonrecognition event (depend-
ing on the absence or presence of a cash bonus) are equally applicable to the lease
with the landowner and to a farmout sublease to a driller in which the fund partici-
pants keep only an overriding royalty interest. However, these concepts are not terri-
bly useful because nonrecognition (except of a cash bonus) for those transactions does
not depend on the complete or divisible sharing arrangement concepts. Characteri-
zation of these transactions as a lease or sublease is sufficient to explain nonrecogni-
tion. The act of entering into a lease is generally not a recognition event. Perhaps
10611983-84]
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according to its nature:70 the portion involving the cash bonus is a
sale 71 and the balance of the transaction is a sharing arrangement. 72
This is the standard industry model 73 used for comparison and as
this explains why the terms "sharing arrangement" or "divisible sharing arrange-
ment" do not seem to be used in referring to those transactions.
70. See F. BURKE & R. BOWHAY, supra note 15, $ 7.01, at 701. As previously
mentioned, the sharing arrangement has not been the subject of any case even
though the concept is quite old. See note 53 supra. The firmest authority for the
concept is the 1941 G.C.M. 22730, 1941-1 C.B. 214. The divisible sharing arrange-
ment has not been the subject of case law or even of a Service ruling. F. BURKE & R.
BOWHAY, supra note 15, 7.14. This may be due to the fact that proper tax treat-
ment of sharing arrangements is now considered settled law and the treatment of
divisible sharing arrangements follows naturally. However, at least one authority
considers the rules applicable to sharing arrangements generally to be "only in the
formative stage." Id. 7.19.
71. See F. BURKE & R. BOWHAY, supra note 15, $$ 3.03, 7.06, 7.19.
72. Id. $ 7.01, .06. Commentators will sometimes classify a divisible sharing
arrangement as either a sale or a sharing arrangement, depending on which it pri-
marily is. This does not, however, lead them to confuse the proper tax treatment for
the two parts. See id. T 3.05.
73. Important to the overall scheme of taxation of oil and gas transactions is a
determination of whether certain owned interests are economic interests. The pres-
ence of an economic interest is one requirement for availability of depletion deduc-
tions. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Southwest Exploration Co., 350 U.S. 308, 313-15
(1956); Burton-Sutton Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 328 U.S. 25, 32 (1946); Palmer v.
Bender, 287 U.S. 551 (1933); G.C.M. 22730, 1941-1 C.B. 214; Treas. Reg. § 1.611-
1(b) (1968); A. BRUEN & W. TAYLOR, supra note 12, 11 7.03, .03[2]; A. YOUNG, supra
note 9, 11-2. This is the primary importance of classification of an interest as an
economic interest. F. BURKE & R. BOWHAY, supra note 15, 2.09; A. YOUNG, supra
note 9, 11-1. Development of the concept of economic interest was founded on the
notion that substantive ownership, not legal title, is the relevant inquiry. Commis-
sioner v. Southwest Exploration Co., 350 U.S. 308 (1956); Kirby Petroleum Co. v.
Commissioner, 326 U.S. 599 (1946); Palmer v. Bender, 287 U.S. 551 (1933); Estate of
Weinert v, Commissioner, 294 F.2d 750 (5th Cir. 1961); Treas. Reg. § 1.611-1(b),
T.D. 7261, 1973-1 C.B. 309; A. BRUEN & W. TAYLOR, supra note 12, 7.03. Since
availability of depletion deductions is not within the focus of this article, the concept
of economic interest will not be further discussed. For authorities on economic inter-
est classification of landowner's royalty, see Kirby Petroleum Co. v. Commissioner,
326 U.S. 599 (1946); Palmer v. Bender, 287 U.S. 551 (1933); Commissioner v. Laird,
91 F.2d 498 (5th Cir. 1937); I.R.C. § 611(b)(l) (1982); G.C.M. 22730, 1941-1 C.B.
214; A. BRUEN & W. TAYLOR, supra note 12, T 7.03[1], at 706; A. YOUNG, supra note
9, 9-18. For a discussion of economic interest classification of working interests, see
A. BRUEN & W. TAYLOR, supra note 12, $ 7.0311]; A. YOUNG, supra note 9, I 2-9, 9-
18. See also Burton-Sutton Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 328 U.S. 25 (1946); Palmer v.
Bender, 287 U.S. 551 (1933); Lynch v. Alworth-Stephens Co., 267 U.S. 364 (1925);
Greensboro Gas Co. v. Commissioner, 30 B.T.A. 1362 (1934), af'd, 79 F.2d 701 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 639 (1935); I.R.C. § 611(b)(l) (1982); G.C.M. 22730, 1941-
1 C.B. 214. For a discussion of economic interest classification of overriding royalty
interests, see Burton-Sutton Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 328 U.S. 25 (1946); Kirby Pe-
troleum Co. v. Commissioner, 326 U.S. 599 (1946); Thomas v. Perkins, 301 U.S. 655
(1937); Palmer v. Bender, 287 U.S. 551 (1933); Louisiana Land & Exploration Co. v.
Commissioner, 6 T.C. 172 (1946); West v. Commissioner, 3 T.C. 431 (1944), aff'd, 150
F.2d 723 (5th Cir. 1945), cerl. denied, 326 U.S. 795 (1946); A. BRUEN & W. TAYI.OR,
supra note 12, 7.03[1]; A. YOUNG, supra note 9, T 2-6. For a discussion of economic
interest classification of carried and carrying worrying interests, see Burton-Sutton
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a point of departure for purposes of the analysis which follows. The
focus of this article is on the proper characterization of gain from the
cash bonus paid up front by the driller to the fund participants in this
divisible sharing arrangement transaction.
IV. THE INTER SE RESTRUCTURING
A. The Inter Se Rearrangement
While the position of the fund participants at the close of this
standard transaction is advantageous, there may be some who would
prefer to be in a different position. 4 This could be accomplished as
follows. First, all of the foregoing should be done as part of one trans-
action, which will take all fund participants to precisely the point
already described. A separate transaction which does not involve all
of the prior parties would then follow. The parties to this transaction
will consist only of the fund participants, a transaction accordingly
referred to as the "inter se transaction," since the fund participants are
now transacting among themselves, or inter se.75 The driller, who ac-
quired the carrying working interest, is not a party to the inter se
transaction.
The thter se transaction involves a rearrangment of the rights of
the fund participants. When the transaction is completed, those fund
participants who prefer a higher share of proceeds available to a car-
ried working interest will receive the entire carried working interest of
all fund participants, subject to the landowner's royalty and the over-
riding royalty interest discussed below. These fund participants are
marshalled into Group 1. Those fund participants who prefer the
greater safety of an overriding royalty interest in which they will have
no further responsibility for any costs at any time, and who therefore
are willing to accept a smaller share of proceeds, will be marshalled
into Group 2.76 Regardless of the route for marshalling the various
Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 328 U.S. 25 (1946); G.C.M. 22730, 1941-1 C.B. 214; A.
YOUNG, supra note 9, 2-9. See also text accompanying notes 26-46 supra. All of the
property interests central to the discussion in this article are economic interests.
74. The most common reason for some of the fund participants to prefer a dif-
ferent position is a desire to decrease their risk in the venture in return for a smaller
portion of the proceeds.
75. While the inter se transaction may occur after the initial transaction, it is
contemplated that it will occur prior to the casing point, and, if earlier, prior to the
time the well is proven. For a discussion of the importance of the sequence of these
events, see text following note 103 thfra.
76. The intent of a Group 2 participant at the time of the initial transaction to
transfer all operating rights subsequent to the initial transaction does not convert the
working interest he has after the initial transaction into a nonworking interest.
Treas. Reg. § 1.6 14 -5(g) (1961). Therefore, the sale or exchange character of the
10631983-841
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rights among the Group 1 and the Group 2 participants, the Group 1
participants will end up with a carried working interest and the
Group 2 participants will end up with an overriding royalty interest.
It appears that the iner se transaction itself will not be a recogni-
tion event and therefore no current tax cost will be present. 77 A total
of five alternative tax theories explain why the transaction is not a
recognition event. As to the rearrangement itself, there are two com-
peting ways of viewing how the property rights are marshalled in the
inler se transaction. The tax reasons for nonrecognition vary with the
particular marshalling view adopted.
Under one view of marshalling, the Group 1 participants agree
to pay the obligations of the Group 2 participants for all future costs.
In return, the Group 1 participants receive the right to a larger share
of proceeds than they had previously held. This increment is carved
out of the interest held by the Group 2 participants prior to the in/erse
transaction. The increment is not an overriding royalty interest be-
cause of the corresponding responsibility for costs which flows with it
to the Group 1 participants.7 8 The share of the rights to proceeds to
which the Group 2 participants will be entitled from the overriding
royalty interest 79 is reatned by them out of the share of rights they
already had. It is set at such a level that no cash will change hands in
the zn/er se transaction. The share of proceeds retained by the Group
2 participants will obviously be smaller than it was before the inter se
transaction since the decrement is what must go to the Group 1 par-
ticipants to induce them to increase their responsibility to pay costs.
Since the Group 1 participants will end up with a right to a share of
proceeds subject to a share of costs, but with the benefit of the carry,
they will have a carried working interest. Since the Group 2 partici-
pants will be entitled to a share of proceeds without any responsibility
to pay costs, they will have an overriding royalty interest.
Alternatively, under a second view of marshalling, the Group 2
initial transaction with its attendant capital gain treatment is not automatically
jeopardized.
77. Little time may have passed between the date of acquisition of the working
interest by lease from the landowner and the date of the iter se transaction. With
little time for appreciation, the gain may not be great and recognition may not mat-
ter. Of course, recognition may matter if intervening time or a significant interven-
ing event has caused a substantial increase in value. For instance, obtaining a driller
to develop the property and carry the limited partnership's fraction of the working
interest to the casing point may be such an event.
78. See I.R.C. § 614(d) (1982); Treas. Reg. § 1.614-2(b), T.D. 6859, 1965-2 C.B.
185 (the increment is a working interest).
79. Since the Group 2 participants will be entitled to a share of proceeds with-
out any responsibility to pay costs, they will have an overriding royalty interest.
1064 [Vol. 29: p. 1047
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participants simply transfer their entire share of the carried interest to
the Group 1 participants and receive in return an overriding royalty
interest from the Group 1 participants. The end result is identical to
the result attained under the first view of marshalling. However,
there is an important difference between the two views. Under the
second view all of the rights to proceeds of the Group 2 participants
are transferred to the Group 1 participants. The royalty interest
which the Group 2 participants will have must therefore be carved
out of the proceeds rights of the Group 1 participants. Under the first
view it was retained by the Group 2 participants out of rights they
already had.8 0
These divergent views are not without precedent in other areas
of the law. Two examples, a transfer of a fee with reservation of a life
estate, and a sale and leaseback, though far from analogous to the
in/er se transaction, may be illustrative. The concept of a reserved life
estate is commonly accepted, even though the rights represented
could simply be transferred away and then transferred back. Instead,
the rights are thought to be retained because there is no point in
transferring and then, so to speak, "untransferring" them. Con-
versely, in a sale and leaseback the idea that the seller receives certain
rights back as lessee is generally accepted, even though those rights
were lesser-included rights in the seller's hands prior to the transac-
tion and could therefore be thought of as retained.
Which view is adopted may be an essentially arbitrary decision.
B. Tax Consequences of the Inter Se Transaction
There are five separate bases for concluding that the in/er se
80. When a landowner leases out his mineral rights, his royalty interest is
thought to be retained. When fund participants deal with a driller, the carried work-
ing interest is also though to be retained. These comparative transactions may sug-
gest adoption of the first view of the nther se transaction. In both of these somewhat
analogous situations the landowner or the fund participants, as the case may be,
already had a right to proceeds out of which their resulting right to proceeds could be
taken. In neither situation, however, did the other party to the transaction own any
right to proceeds beforehand. In those situations no source exists out of which the
right to proceeds of the landowner or the fund participants could be carved, unless,
as seems to be accepted in the sale and leaseback situation discussed in the text, the
carving out occurs after the transfer. The real source, therefore, must be in proceeds
rights they already had. In short, they retain proceeds rights which were lesser-in-
cluded interests in what they already had. By sharp contrast, in the inter se transac-
tion, the Group I and Group 2 participants both have proceeds rights before the
transaction which are precisely the same (except for proportional differences), and
either of which could be the source of the overriding royalty interest of the Group 2
participants. Unlike the somewhat analogous situations used for comparison, it is
therefore conceptually possible for the inter se transaction to be interpreted according
to the second view.
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transaction is not a recognition event, and therefore not taxable. The
reasons for reaching this conclusion vary with one's view of how the
assets are marshalled. The five tax approaches to the matter are as
follows: (1) the interse transaction is a lease; (2) the zterse transaction
is an exchange in which the Group 2 participants transfer a portion of
their right to proceeds, and in return the Group 1 participants relieve
them of responsibility for potential costs which are not yet a debt;
(3) the inter se transaction is an exchange in which the Group 2 par-
ticipants transfer a portion of their proceeds rights and in return the
Group 1 participants relieve them of responsibility for costs, which,
even if viewed as a debt, are of unkown amount and must be given
open transaction treatment; (4) the inter se transaction is a mere shift
in interests in the nature of a sharing arrangement; (5) the inter se
transaction is a like-kind exchange. The first three tax approaches to
the inter se transaction are compatible only with the first view of how
the assets are marshalled. The fourth approach is compatible with
either view. The fifth approach is compatible with the second view
only.
1. First Approach
If the transaction is perceived as an exchange of rights, then the
inter se transaction closely parallels the original transaction between
the landowner and the fund participants.81 It also follows, very
closely, what would have occurred if the fund participants had re-
tained only an overriding royalty interest rather than a carried work-
ing interest in their dealings with the driller.8 2 The inter se transaction
under this approach emerges as a lease, albeit a "sub-sublease." The
Group 2 participants transfer all their interest in the carried working
interest (retaining their overriding royalty interest) to the Group 1
participants who undertake the pre-existing obligation to pay the fu-
ture costs of the Group 2 participants. This situation is the same as
that in which the fund participants transfer all their interest in the
working interest (subject to retention of an overriding royalty inter-
est) to the driller who undertakes to pay the pre-existing obligation of
the fund participants to the landowner to pay all future costs. If the
latter is a lease (or a sublease), so is the former.8 3 Leases are not taxa-
ble for a cash basis taxpayer until cash is received (and none is re-
81. For a discussion of the transaction between the landowner and the fund
participants, see text accompanying notes 13-26 supra.
82. For a discussion of the fund participants' retention of carried working inter-
ests, see text accompanying notes 42-46 supra.
83. For a discussion of this sublease, see text accompanying notes 29-30 supra.
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ceived in the tnter se transaction) or, for an accrual basis taxpayer,
until cash is earned over time. Thus, the mere act of entering into the
lease is not a recognition event for either type of taxpayer. Lease
treatment is in accord with the first view of how the assets are mar-
shalled in the iter se transaction.8 4
2. Second and Third Approaches
If what happens is perceived as an exchange, it could be consid-
ered a transfer of a fraction of a carried working interest (subject to a
reserved overriding royalty interest by the transferor) in exchange for
an undertaking by the transferee to pay the transferor's obligation for
future costs. Under tax law, the act of assuming someone else's debt
is generally deemed the equivalent of paying him cash. 5 The issue of
taxable income due to relief from indebtedness would generally arise.
Nevertheless, there are two reasons why nonrecognition should
apply. First, the debt does not exist at the time of the inter se transac-
tion. The debt is contingent and will only arise if the driller chooses
to develop the working interest.8 6 The driller customarily is no more
obligated to the fund participants to proceed than are the fund par-
ticipants obligated to the landowner to proceed. Either party could
simply let his interest lapse. Basically, the payment of future amounts
is more in the nature of contributions which might be required in the
future than of future payment of a present debt. The person under-
taking to pay the costs is undertaking that and no more. A second
reason for nonrecognition is that open transaction treatment should
be available if the Service were to contend that the transaction in-
volves a sale with relief from a debt because there is no way of mea-
suring the quantity of costs which have been undertaken at the time
of the "sale." These treatments are necessarily compatible only with
the first view of how the assets are marshalled in the in/er se
transaction.8 7
84. It cannot fit the second view because the overriding rights are viewed as
retained, not as transferred with the rest of proceeds rights, then carved out and
transferred back.
85. See, e.g., Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1 (1947); I.R.C. §61(a)(12)(1982).
86. See note 122 and accompanying text infta. If the undertaking by the Group
1 participants were viewed as an immediate payment of cash to the Group 2 partici-
pants, the inter se transaction could be restructured so that the Group 2 participants
would remain liable for costs to the driller and the Group I participants would be
obligated to pay equivalent sums to the Group 2 participants. Should the Service
contend that this transaction is a sale, it would have to allow installment reporting of
the income.
87. For a discussion of the first view, see notes 78-79 and accompanying text
supra.
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3. Fourth Approach
Had the fund participants retained only an overriding royalty
interest rather than a carried working interest when they first trans-
acted with the driller, and also retained a right to convert the overrid-
ing royalty interest into a fraction of the working interest after payout
or after an otherwise specified amount of production, the fund par-
ticipants would be in a position to engage in a transaction somewhat
akin to the inter se transaction. The fund participants on conversion
would be transacting with a party with whom they already share eco-
nomic rights in the same oil and gas in place. Conversion of the over-
riding royalty interest into a fraction of the working interest has been
called a mere "shift in interests," rather than a recognition event.,,
This seems like a soft way of calling it a "sale or exchange", and
therefore a curious reason for not recognizing the event. However,
since the lease transaction setting up the overriding royalty interest
with a conversion right seems itself to be a sharing arrangement, and
therefore not a recognition event notwithstanding the shifts in interest
involved,8 9 the logic of the sharing arrangement concept can reason-
ably be seen to include subsequent mere "shifts in interests." The
transfer of the obligation to pay future costs can be seen as the trans-
fer of an obligation to make a future contribution to the shared un-
dertaking. If actual contribution is not considered a recognition
event, then neither should be a change in the party who will make the
contribution.
This conversion of an overriding royalty interest into a working
interest is not just analagous to the inter se transaction. It is the i'nter se
transaction viewed from the other side (except for the conversion
right), although it is not employed in the same context as the inter se
transaction. In the inter se transaction, the Group 2 participants part
with a share of their right to proceeds and, accordingly, are relieved
of their share of costs. In the present comparative transaction, the
driller parts with a share of proceeds and is relieved of an attendant
share of costs, while owners of the overriding royalty interest who con-
vert that interest into a working interest acquire that share of pro-
ceeds and undertake those costs. The position of the driller, in terms
of what he gives and what he receives in the present comparative
transaction, is the same as that of Group 2 participants in the inter se
transaction. The situation of the former owners of the overriding roy-
alty interest who converted that interest into a working interest in the
88. See A. BRUEN & W. TAYI.OR, supra note 12, $ 8.0313].
89. For a discussion of the sharing arrangement, see note 69 and accompanying
text supra.
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present comparative transaction with the driller is the opposite side of
the situation of the Group 2 participants in the inter se transaction.
Since the conversion is a mere shift in interests,9° the inter se transac-
tion should also be treated as a mere shift in interests.
The presence of a right to convert in the present comparative
transaction may be a distinction but, as discussed in Part V of this
article, it need not be.9' Nor should this potential distinction matter.
The point in time of conversion (and therefore the quantity of costs
whose responsibility is shifted) is also different; this, too, should not
matter because the only changes are to the values involved, not the
nature of the transaction.
Like the present comparative transaction, the inter se transaction
should not be a recognition event. Implicit in the conclusion that the
in/er se transaction is a mere shifting of interests and not an exchange
may be the first view of how the assets are marshalled in the inter se
transaction.92 However, this conclusion is also not incompatible with
the fiction in the second view of how the assets are marshalled: that
there is no exchange under the sharing arrangement since no rights
are transferred. 93
4. Fifth Approach
Ignoring boot issues related to equipment, it may also be possible
to view the comparative transaction of conversion of an overriding
royalty interest into a fraction of working interest as a like-kind ex-
change94 of economic interests in minerals in place. If so, the opposite
conversion-of a fraction of a working interest into an overriding roy-
alty interest-should also be a like-kind exchange. Interests in oil and
gas in place are normally considered real estate under local law or are
deemed to be real estate for tax purposes. 95 It follows that a royalty
interest and a working interest are like-kind properties, 96 and there-
fore an overriding royalty interest and a fraction of a working interest
are also like-kind properties. What happens in the inter se transaction
would seem to fit the purpose of the like-kind exchange provisions,
which is to protect transactions involving essential continuity of in-
90. For a discussion of this shift in interests, see text accompanying note 69 supra.
91. For a discussion of this distinction, see text accompanying notes 101-22 infra.
92. For a discussion of the first view of how assets are marshalled in the 'nter se
transaction, see text accompanying notes 78-79 supra.
93. See notes 56-60 and accompanying text and text accompanying note 64
supra.
94. A. BRUEN & W. TAYLOR, supra note 12, 8.03[3] n.53; 8.10.
95. See, e.g., id. 8.10[l].
96. See 8.10[11 (citing Rev. Rul. 186, 1968-1 C.B. 354).
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vestment from recognition, 97 since the value remains invested in the
same property. The inter se transaction may therefore properly be
viewed as a like-kind exchange. So viewed, it will not be a recogni-
tion event. The change in responsibility for future costs should not
complicate a view of the znter se transaction as a like-kind exchange
because that contingent responsibility is not a present debt, or liabil-
ity.98 This change is the same in the present comparative transaction
as it is in the inter se transaction. Implicit in the conclusion that the
inter se transaction is not a recognition event because it is a like-kind
exchange is the second view of marshalling assets wherein the group
participants give up all of one kind of interest in return for a similar
or "like-kind" interest. 99
There are thus five analyses explaining why the in/er se transac-
tion should not be treated as a recognition event. Four of these are
consistent with the first view of how the assets are marshalled; two are
consistent with the second view. While the manner in which the as-
sets are marshalled is conceptually interesting, its significance for tax
purposes relates only to determining the available routes to nonrecog-
nition. As an issue in its own right, the way in which the assets are
marshalled cannot be resolved. Both marshalling views are viable
and therefore neither can claim hegemony. Each is predicated on the
understanding that the Group I and Group 2 participants entered
the inter se transaction with undivided interests in the carried working
interest of the lease fund.
V. THE ECONOMIC REALITIES
A. General Discussion
The economic realities underlying the contemplated transactions
will ultimately determine the tax effects.100 Each of the transactions
discussed above, the initial basic industry model and the inter se re-
structuring, seems to contain strong elements of economic reality;'1'
97. See Davis v. United States, 589 F.2d 446, 449 (9th Cir. 1979); Lakritz v.
United States, 418 F. Supp. 210, 211 (E.D. Wis. 1976); S. REP. No. 1983, 85th Cong.,
2d Sess. 72-73, reprt'nedtn 1958 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4791, 4862.
98. For a discussion of the effect of the contingent liability on the transaction,
see text accompanying note 87 supra. See also note 122 and accompanying text tnfra.
99. This is the view which holds that while the sharing agreement is an ex-
change of rights, it is nevertheless nontaxable for policy reasons. For a discussion of
these reasons, see notes 62-66 and accompanying text supra.
100. Estate of Weinert v. Commissioner, 294 F.2d 750, 752 (5th Cir. 1961).
101. The term "economic reality" is used herein in its normal English language
sense. An inquiry into the economic realities of a transaction is thus simply an in-
quiry into its real economic substance. For a further discussion of the economic real-
ity of transactions, see note 107 tifra.
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both reflect genuine economic, nontax changes in position. The
transactions appear to be separate or separable. If this is true of the
individual transactions and remains true when the transactions are
combined, then the tax consequences which would attend the trans-
actions if viewed in isolation should remain intact when the transac-
tions are combined. This will now be explored.
When different parties engage in separate transactions, some will
find the conclusion of economic reality inexorable. "Separate" may
seem an absolute; either the transactions are separate or they are not.
Unfortunately, life is not that simple. Separate transactions can, for
instance, sometimes be found in a single set of documents, even
though the parties to the transactions are not all the same. They can
also occur simultaneously, although the more connections there are
between transactions, the greater the likelihood of confusion.
With respect to the contemplated transactions the focus of the
confusion is on the treatment of the cash paid up front in the initial
transaction between the driller and the fund participants. If the ini-
tial transaction and the inter se transaction are viewed as separate,
capital gain rather than ordinary income results to all of the fund
participants. The danger in confusing the transactions is that the in/er
se transaction might seem to taint the cash received up front by the
Group 2 participants in the initial transaction, thereby transforming
it from capital gain into ordinary income.10 2
Ideally, from the fund participants' points of view, any connec-
tion between the two transactions should be avoided. If possible, the
documents should be separate and the transactions should occur at
different times. It cannot be overemphasized that without complete
separation, confusion is the likely result. Yet the more closely con-
nected the two transactions, the clearer the focus on the ultimate the-
oretical issue discussed herein, which is whether capital gain
treatment remains appropriate for the cash bonus received by the
Group 2 participants in the initial, basic industry model
transaction. 103
B. Order
Obviously, the in/er se transaction must occur either subsequent
to, or simultaneous with, the inital transaction. But even if they oc-
cur simultaneously, on a conceptual level the zter se transaction must
102. For a list of authorities on the tax treatment of this transaction, see note 72
supra.
103. For a discussion of this initial transaction, see notes 66-73 and accompany-
ing text supra.
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occur second. Should the Service try to designate the two transac-
tions as something other than what they appear to be, it will have to
mix the elements of the transactions together. The Service, therefore,
cannot allow the fund participants the separateness in time which
they may employ because it must attack the conceptual order the
participants will want to claim.
If the inter se transaction were thought to occur first, then what
was the initial transaction would be different in nature. Understand-
ing this change is important to appreciating how the Service might
attack the transactions if simultaneity or other non-essential connec-
tions are permitted to confuse what the participants believe they are
doing. If the inter se transaction occurs first, then all of the working
interest would be owned by the Group 1 participants at the time of
what was (and will continue to be called) the initial transaction. The
Group 2 participants would have only an overriding royalty interest
at the time of the initial transaction. It seems obvious that since the
Group 2 participants would have no working interest they could not
sell a working interest. Thus, gain from cash flowing from the driller
to the Group 1 participants, albeit through the lease fund, would be
treated as capital gain; but gain from cash flowing to the Group 2
participants would look like ordinary income in the form of advance
royalties. Under this view, the result sought by the Group 2 partici-
pants would be lost.
Unless the terms of each transaction are altered, there are serious
difficulties with the economics of this conceptual reversal of the order
of the two transactions. Although the reversal appears straighfor-
ward, it will leave the parties in a substantially different economic
position from that contemplated. If the transaction were to proceed
as proposed, the fund participants will part with a fractional share of
the working interest in favor of the driller before creating the overrid-
ing royalty interest of the Group 2 participants in the zner se transac-
tion. A critical aspect of this conceptual, if not actual, order (in time)
is that the overriding rights of the Group 2 participants do not over-
ride the portion of the working interest held by the driller. They only
override the portion held by the Group 1 participants. This must be
true, because when the fund participants transact among themselves,
the driller does not participate and the driller's interest cannot be
subordinated to the overriding royalty interests of the Group 2 par-
ticipants. However, if the inler se transaction were thought to occur
first, all of the working interest will be involved, and therefore the
overriding royalty interests of the Group 2 participants will override
all of the working interest, including the portion destined for the
[Vol. 29: p. 10471072
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driller. Thus, this ostensibly simple placement of the inter se transac-
tion prior to the initial transaction puts the parties in an entirely dif-
ferent position from that in which they would have been, and
therefore lacks merit as a deemed restructuring.
In spite of the foregoing, two mechanical alterations to the con-
ceptual reversal will overcome this difficulty and place the parties to
both transactions back in the positions they would have been in
under the contemplated transactions. A detailed analysis of the flow
of assets in all three hypothesized fact patterns (the transactions as
contemplated, plus each of these two deemed restructurings) is neces-
sary to appraise the reasonableness of the deemed restructurings.
First, each of the three hypothesized fact patterns will be described.
They will then be compared. In all three scenarios it will be assumed
that the fund participants have already acquired the working interest
from the landowner, who in turn retained a royalty interest. The
fund participants paid the landowner a cash bonus and undertook to
pay all costs.
1. Fact Pattern One.- The Proposed Transactions
In the first scenario, which embraces the transactions proposed in
this article, the following events occur. In step one, the driller ac-
quires a carrying working interest from the fund participants, who
retain a carried working interest. The driller pays the fund partici-
pants a cash bonus, undertakes to pay the portion of costs allocable to
the carrying working interest and agrees to the carry. In step two, the
fund participants transact among themselves in the inter se transaction
as to the carried working interest only. There are a total of only two
transactions, or two steps, which take all parties to the point contem-
plated. The driller participates in only one transaction or step.
2. Fact Pattern Two: An Alternative Deemed Restructurtng
In the second scenario, the timing of the two transactions is re-
versed, but a mechanical alteration corrects the priority problem dis-
cussed above. The events occur as follows: in step one, the fund
participants transact among themselves in an inter se transaction as to
the entire working interest. The Group 1 participants end up with all
the working interest and the Group 2 participants end up with an
overriding royalty interest which overrides the entire working inter-
est. The Group 1 participants undertake to pay all costs. In step two,
the driller acquires a carrying working interest from the Group 1 par-
ticipants, who retain a carried working interest. The driller then pays
the Group 1 participants a cash bonus, undertakes to pay the portion
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of costs allocable to the carrying working interest and agrees to the
carry. In step three, the driller pays cash to the Group 2 participants
and acquires a portion of the overriding royalty interest from the
Group 2 participants, who retain the remaining portion. Under this
fact pattern, a total of three transactions are necessary to take all par-
ties to the point contemplated, and the driller must participate in
two.
3. Fact Pattern Three.- A Second Alternative Deemed Restructurng
In the third scenario, events occur as follows: Initially (in what is
not here counted as a separate step) the working interest is divided
into two parts. In step one, the fund participants transact among
themselves in an iter se transaction as to only one part of the divided
working interest. After the transaction, the Group 1 participants are
left with all of this portion of the working interest, and Group 2 par-
ticipants are left with an overriding royalty interest in only that por-
tion of the working interest. Thus, the Group 1 participants
undertake to pay all the costs associated with that portion of the
working interest, but both the Group 1 and Group 2 participants still
retain their respective shares of the second portion of the working in-
terest, together with their attendant shares of costs. In step two, the
driller acquires a carrying working interest from the Group 1 partici-
pants, who keep a carried working interest, in just the first part of the
working interest. The driller pays the Group 1 participants a cash
bonus, undertakes to pay the costs allocable to the carrying working
interest in just the first part and agrees to the carry in just the first
part. In step three, the driller acquires a carrying working interest
from the Group 1 participants, who keep a carried working interest,
in just the second part of the working interest. The driller pays the
Group 1 participants a cash bonus, undertakes to pay the costs alloca-
ble to the carrying working interest in just the second part and agrees
to the carry in just the second part. In step four, the driller acquires
all the working interest of the Group 2 participants in just the second
part of the working interest. The driller pays cash to the Group 2
participants, who keep no interest in the second part of the working
interest, and he undertakes to pay all costs allocable to the portion of
the second part of the working interest which was owned by the
Group 2 participants. The interest the driller acquires in this fourth
step can be thought of as merging with the carrying working interest
which the driller acquired in steps two and three.
Under this third scenario, a total of four transactions are neces-
sary to take all parties to the point contemplated, and the driller must
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participate in three. When the driller acquires a carrying working
interest from the Group 1 participants as to both the first and second
parts of the working interest, the driller and the Group 1 participants
are the only parties in each transaction. These two transactions or
steps could therefore be combined into one transaction or step. Even
so, there would still be three total transactions, and the driller would
have to engage in two of them.
4. Analyss
As we have just seen, it is obviously quite possible for the parties
to both transactions-the initial transaction and the inter se transac-
tion-to arrive at the same economic position even if the order of the
two transactions is deemed reversed. Superficially, the fact that a
deemed restructuring of the transactions produces more taxes for the
government makes the two alternatives to the proposed transactions
seem quite reasonable. What each party has before the transactions is
obviously the same, no matter which transaction occurs first. What
each has after the transactions is also the same, again regardless of the
order. At this point the only difference may seem to be in the poten-
tial tax effect. The difference in how the parties get from the same
antecedent positions to the same subsequent positions may appear to
be merely a difference in how the soup is stirred.
What should a court do when faced with competing ways of
looking at what happened? On different facts and issues, but faced
with similarly competing versions of what happened, some courts
have looked to what the parties actually did, rather than to what they
could have done.'0 4 This approach would clearly leave the Group 2
participants with the tax result they desire. Thus, the taxpayers
might win even if the transactions had occurred simultaneously in
one set of documents.
There are a number of tax cases, however, where courts have
imposed alternative structures or interpretations, thereby producing a
larger tax.105 These courts generally look for what may be called the
104. See Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561 (1978) (sale-and-lease-
back not a sham); Commissioner v. National Alfalfa Dehydrating & Milling Corp.,
417 U.S. 134 (1974) (corporation could not consider fair value of preferred stock in
calculating original issue discount for debentures issued in retirement of preferred
stock); Better Beverages, Inc. v. United States, 619 F.2d 424 (5th Cir. 1980) (absent a
demonstrable agreement, no part of a lump sum purchase would be allocated to
covenant not to compete rather than to goodwill); Murray v. Commissioner, 601 F.2d
892, 893 (5th Cir. 1979) ("[a] transaction must be given its effect in accordance with
what actually occurred and not in accordance with what might have occurred").
105. See Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc. v. United States, 602 F.2d 270 (Ct. Cl.
1979) (the Service may restructure non-arms-length transaction between taxpayer
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real substance of the transactions.' 0 6 They look for the direct or
straightforward way of taking the parties from the starting point to
the concluding point. If the route adopted by the parties is compara-
tively convoluted, these courts will ignore it in favor of a more
straightforward version of the events.10 7 It is not common, however,
for the transaction to be deemed restructured solely because more
taxes will result.
The question, then, is which of the alternative routes discussed
above is more straightforward. In each scenario a count was made of
the number of discrete transactions or steps necessary to arrive ulti-
mately at the same economic position. In the transaction as initially
contemplated, there are two steps: the initial transaction followed by
the inter se transaction. The driller is engaged in only the former, or
just one, transaction. However, in both the second and third fact pat-
terns there are at least three transactions; the driller, who is not con-
cerned with the special 'ther se considerations of the fund participants,
must participate in two of them. The number of transactions has in-
creased by at least fifty percent.
The proposed transactions of the first fact pattern take the par-
ties to the positions they desire in a simple, direct and straightforward
way. They allow the driller to deal only once with a cohesive group
of similarly situated fund participants. With either of the three-step
alternatives, life becomes considerably more complicated for all in-
volved, not just because the number of transactions increases, but also
because of the reasons for the increases. If the inter se transaction were
deemed to be first, then the number of transactions required to get
and controlled corporation), cert. denid, 445 U.S. 927 (1980); Aristar, Inc. v. United
States, 553 F.2d 644 (Ct. Cl. 1977) (the Service can allocate interest income to elimi-
nate income distortions resulting from interest-free loans between related taxpayers);
Hilton v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 305 (1980) (depreciation deduction disallowed for
limited partners because sale-and-leaseback by which partnership acquired property
was not a genuine and multiparty transaction with economic substance), ajf'dper
curiam, 671 F.2d 316 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 907 (1982). Cf Frank Lyon Co. v.
United States, 435 U.S. 561, 580 n.15 (1978) (Court suggested that not imposing an
alternative structure may garner more taxes and, accordingly, held against the
Commissioner).
106. Attacks that are variously labeled lack of economic reality, sham theory,
and step transaction doctrine, are all different aspects of the principle that courts will
scrutinize transactions according to their underlying business purpose. See Gregory v.
Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935). For a discussion of Gregoy, and the different mean-
ings which attend the use of these different terms, see 2 S. SURREY, W. WARREN, P.
MCDANIEL & H. AULT, FEDERAl. INCOME TAXATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 672-
78 (2d ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as SURREY].
107. See Minnesota Tea Co. v. Helvering, 302 U.S. 609, 613 (1938) (when re-
viewing the acts of the parties for economic significance, "[a] given result at the end
of the straight path is not made a different result because reached by following a
devious path").
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the parties to the same point increases because the transactions them-
selves are fundamentally changed and therefore become considerably
more complicated.
In the second scenario, for example, the inter se transaction is
quite different because it applies to the entire working interest. Too,
the initial transaction would be drastically different because the
Group 2 participants would be transferring to the driller a fractional
share of an overriding royalty interest instead of a fractional share of
a working interest. This change is one of the reasons why the number
of discretely identifiable transactions grows, reflecting the fact that
what the Group 2 participants transfer to the driller is different in
nature from the working interest which the Group 1 participants
transfer. There is something strained about so drastically altering the
timing of the transactions when doing so complicates rather than
simplifies.
In the third scenario, the inter se rearrangement is even more
complex. The fund's entire working interest is first divided into two
parts and the inter se transaction applies to only one of them. More-
over, the fund participants must predetermine the precise size of the
two portions and/or the precise quantity of override for the Group 2
participants in the first portion so that both groups are left with satis-
factory rights when the driller's goals become known. This may re-
quire singular intuitive foresight. If the driller's goals were already
known because all transactions are occurring simultaneously, the
need to look first at what will satisfy the driller suggests the correct
conceptual ordering of the transactions. As an aside, the same need
to look at the entire transaction seems to exist when determining the
terms of the initial transaction when the transactions occur in the or-
der contemplated. The terms of an anticipated inter se transaction
would certainly profitably inform the fund participants when they
first deal with the driller. This response misses an important point,
however: obtaining a driller who will do all the work and carry the
fund to the casing point is of paramount importance-assuming that
the fund participants, as is typically the case, are not drillers and
never intended to do the actual drilling themselves.1° 8
Dividing the working interest into two parts in order to have the
inter se transaction occur first appears strained. Where the inter se
transaction occurs first, the natural way to proceed would be to give
an overriding royalty interest to the Group 2 participants covering
the entire working interest. However, if the working interest is to be
108. See A. YOUNG, supra note 9, 193.
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divided into two parts, then the restructuring must face the strain
referred to above because the Group 2 participants' override cannot
ultimately cover the entire working interest without altering the final
economic positions of the parties. This strain would seem to rip the
fabric of any greater realism the scenario might have sought to weave
into the transaction.
Although the foregoing suggests that the second scenario is more
realistic than the third, the second contains its own unreality: in its
last step, the driller acquires a portion of the Group 2 overriding roy-
alty interest for cash. By contrast, the driller in the contemplated
transactions (the first scenario) is interested in working interests and
working interests only. It is true that he will have less proceeds rights
if he does not make the acquisition, but it is also true that he will have
more cash which he might prefer to use for working the property.
The driller does not have to acquire a portion of the override and,
indeed, he might not. If he is required to so acquire a part of the
override as a condition of acquiring the working interest, we get a
glimpse of what is really happening in this deemed restructuring.
The driller is really seeking the working interest and, when he adds to
his proceeds rights by acquiring a portion of an overriding royalty
interest, he might see himself as actually acquiring the same working
interest as he would in the transactions as contemplated. He might
therefore think of the portion of the override thrust upon him as rep-
resenting a somewhat smaller proceeds right in the form of part of the
working interest he could have acquired had the deemed restructur-
ing not forced acquisition of part of an override into his
considerations.
Emerging from the foregoing analysis are the significant qualit-
ites of the two alternatives to the contemplated transactions: (1) they
require more transactions to accomplish the same result; (2) they are
more complicated in ways beyond the mere increase in the number of
steps; and (3) each has an aspect of unreality. Taken separately, each
of these qualities, when compared with the proposed transactions il-
lustrated in the first scenario, should be sufficient to reject the alterna-
tives. Taken together, they are compelling. The form proposed by
this article is a straightforward way of viewing the substance. It is not
convoluted. Being straightforward, it stands a reasonable chance of
adoption by even a suspicious court. The alternative versions which
the Service might seek to impose are tortuous diversions. Courts do
not commonly adopt a less straightforward version of events solely for
the purpose of increasing taxes. 0 9 Taxpayers should therefore have a
109. See Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561, 579-80 (1978) ("there
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very reasonable expectation of winning if challenged, even if the
transactions had occurred simultaneously in a single set of
documents.
Furthermore, the detailed analysis allows us to observe just what
the Group 2 participants would be transferring to the driller for cash
in each of the two deemed restructurings. In the second scenario, the
outright transfer of a fraction of an overriding royalty interest by the
Group 2 participants to the driller for cash sounds like a sale" 0 of a
capital gain asset anyway. Similarly, in the third scenario, the out-
right transfer of a fraction of a working interest by the Group 2 par-
ticipants to the driller for cash also sounds like a sale' of a capital
gain asset. The overriding royalty interest with which the Group 2
participants end up in the third scenario does not pertain to the work-
ing interest they transfer to the driller.' 12 The deemed restructurings
would seem to have accomplished nothing. Nevertheless, for reasons
suggested below, the Service may be troubled by the combination of
transactions and may seek to have them viewed differently anyway.
C. Structuring the Contemplated Transactions." Likely Circumstances
Since there are potential alternative views of what occurs, and
since Service curiosity may be piqued by a situation in which inves-
tors with a working interest receive cash, end up with only an overrid-
ing royalty interest, and yet claim the gain as capital gain, cautious
tax counsel will probably want to minimize connections between the
two transactions. Thus, if the ultimate issue is ever presented to a
court, the facts may include three circumstances which increase in
are simply too many contingencies, including variations in the value of real estate, in
the cost of money, and in the capital structure of. . . [the taxpayer], to permit the
conclusion that the parties intended to enter into the transaction as structured [as]
the Government now urges"). But see Eli Lilly v. United States, 372 F.2d 990, 997
(Ct. Cl. 1967) (quoting Leedy-Glover Realty & Ins. Co. v. Commissioner, 13 T.C. 95,
107 (1949) ("Our concern is more with the ultimate results arrived at by the Commis-
sioner than the methods which he uses.").
110. See A. BRUEN & W. TAYLOR, supra note 12, $ 8.04, at 8-16; F. BURKE & R.
BOWHAY, supra note 15, 3.03. It is the position of the Service that any assignment
of an interest in which the transferor retains a nonoperating royalty interest will be
treated as a lease. See Rev. Rul. 352, 1969-1 C.B. 34. However, a transaction will be
treated as a sale whenever the owner of an interest transfers a fractional interest that
is equivalent in nature to the interest retained, or when the owner assigns a continu-
ing nonoperating interest and retains the working interest, or when the owner retains
only a noncontinuing interest in production. F. BURKE & R. BOWHAY, supra note 15,
3.03.
111. See A. BRUEN & W. TAYLOR, supra note 12, 8.03[4], .04, at 8-15 to -16.
112. If this fact is not properly considered, this transaction or step would look
like a lease. See A. BRUEN & W. TAYLOR, supra note 12, 8.04, at 8-16.
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merit in the following order, each circumstance being a step toward
complete separation.
First, were the transactions to occur simultaneously, whether or
not in one set of documents, the right of participants to become
Group 2 participants could be drafted as an option which could be
exercised later. No one would then know who, if anyone, would be a
Group 2 participant or how many such participants there would be.
The deemed restructuring would still be possible as to those partici-
pants who exercise the option. It would be more difficult, however, to
maintain that they parted with the znter se portion of their working
interest in part to obtain cash from the driller, since they would still
have legal and equitable rights to that interest after receiving the
cash. Indeed, they would have every right to keep that interest by not
exercising their options.
Second, the opportunity to become a Group 2 participant could
be made further contingent on the existence of a sufficient number of
Group 1 participants to support the znter se transaction. Put differ-
ently, there could be an option to become a Group 1 participant,
instead of an automatic obligation for failure to exercise the option to
become a Group 2 participant. With the combination of these two
options, the opportunity to sublease oneself into an overriding royalty
position would be contingent not only on one's own action, but also
on the actions of others: the znter se transaction would occur only if a
sufficient number of participants exercised the Group 1 option to ab-
sorb the working interests being transferred and to cover the attend-
ant share of costs.
Third, the parties could remove any connection between the two
transactions by recording them in separate documents with the inter se
transaction occurring second. No obligation whatsoever to enter into
the inter se transaction would exist at the time of the initial
transaction.
It should be noted that the position of the general partner is
unique in all of this. It is obvious that just by reason of his participat-
ing in the znter se transaction he cannot become only a Group 2 par-
ticipant; he will remain the general partner. It is also possible for him
to become a Group 1 participant (here, too, remaining the general
partner), but it would be important in the intermediate steps toward
complete separation that he too have no obligation to be a Group 1
participant. 113
113. The unique position of the general partner deserves further comment.
Even with seemingly complete separation of the two transactions, it will remain pos-
sible for the Service to argue that the transactions were part of a prearranged scheme
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Additional dimensions of the economic realities involved are rel-
evant to consideration of deemed restructuring, but may remain rele-
vant even if deemed restructuring has already failed.
D. Some Additional Economic Reahties
The different parties involved and the terms of the transaction
are important to the view that the two transactions are each economi-
cally realistic and independent of one another. Those two features
are related. In the initial transaction, the Group 1 and Group 2 par-
ticipants are on the same side, with the driller on the other side. The
driller, who acquires the right to a share of the proceeds by agreeing
to carry the lease fund to the casing point and to pay a share of costs
thereafter, cannot profit from the inter se transaction since he is not a
party to it. The presence of the driller in the inital transaction, cou-
pled with his absence from the inter se transaction, seems to assure that
the terms of the initial transaction are set at arm's length. Moreover,
it should be observable that the terms of the initial transaction are
comparable to the terms of similar, unrelated transactions where no
inter se transaction is contemplated. The cash the driller pays to the
lease fund in the initial transaction would therefore be paid only for
what the driller gets in the initial transaction. It follows, then, that
the cash received by the lease fund in the initial transaction is re-
ceived only for what the lease fund gives up in the initial transaction.
It is not received by reason of anything that happens in the inter se
transaction.
Although the parties to the inter se transaction are related by
common ownership of shares in the limited partnership which owns
the lease fund, normally they are otherwise unrelated to each other.
Since their interests are adverse in the inter se transaction, their rela-
tionship as common owners of the limited partnership should not
taint what occurs in the inter se transaction. Unless something suspi-
cious occurs in the inter se transaction, there is no ground for arguing
that the inter se transaction somehow taints the initial transaction.
and that they should be integrated. The attack will have to point to participants in
the scheme from both sides of the inier se transaction. The general partner will be a
prime suspect for having set up the scheme even if he himself were not a Group 1 or
Group 2 participant. Absent specific, detailed facts which cannot be known before
an appropriate case arises, it can only be said that the issue will be for the trier of fact
to decide. A successful attack based on this theory will, moreover, have to overcome
the economic realities which attend the transactions.
If a prearranged scheme is not found, it will still be possible for the Service to
attack on the ground that the general partner and others knew of the possibility that
the tinter se transaction might follow the initial transaction. An argument based on
nothing more should fall on deaf judicial ears.
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A further possible effort by the Service to purportedly "place
substance over form" might be grounded in the notion that Group 1
and Group 2 participants act in unison at the time of the initial trans-
action. However, this pursuit of common interests by related parties
cannot directly taint the initial transaction because of the presence of
the driller. Moreover, it cannot taint the inter se transaction since the
Group 1 and Group 2 participants become adverse in the zter se
transaction. But even if it did, the taint will not deleteriously affect
the inter se transaction for two reasons. First, there is no cash present
in the znter se transaction. Second, even if cash were received in the
inter se transaction, any recognized gain would be treated as ordinary
income under some of the tax approaches to the inter se transaction
regardless of whether the inter se transaction were tainted.
If the znter se transaction were tainted, could that taint spread to
the initial transaction, where cash is present and capital gain treat-
ment for the cash is expected? It seems not, for the same reason that
the initial transaction could not be tainted by the common interests
of the Group 1 and Group 2 participants in the initial transaction.
The driller is present.
It is difficult to restructure the two transactions for the purpose
of placing substance before form because the form already reflects the
substance of the transactions. Nevertheless, the Service will probably
be troubled by the fact that cash received in the initial transaction by
the Group 2 participants is treated as capital gain even though the
Group 2 participants are left with only an overriding royalty interest
after the inter se transaction. Usually, when a person with a working
interest receives cash and an overriding royalty interest, and other-
wise parts with his working interest, the cash is supposed to be treated
as ordinary income. As already mentioned, this will be the result if
the two transactions were not viewed as separate. The Service can,
therefore, be expected to scrutinize closely transactions following the
theme suggested.' 1 4
To crystalize an attack, could the Service simply point to an al-
ternative standard transaction which achieves these tax results? In
this standard transaction, the lease fund participants transfer all of
the working interest they acquired from the landowner, subject only
to retention of an overriding royalty interest, to the driller, receiving
cash as sublease bonus income and benefitting from an undertaking
by the driller to cover all costs. The Service could argue that this
114. For a summary of the Service's position that a lump sum payment received
by the grantor of mineral rights who retains a royalty interest is ordinary income, see
Rev. Rul. 352, 1969-1 C.B. 34.
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standard transaction represents all that happened as far as the Group
2 participants are concerned, and that it places the Group 2 partici-
pants simply and directly in precisely the position at which they
arrived.
The similarity is only superficial, however. There is a key differ-
ence between the economic position arrived at in this short, focused
attack and the real position of the Group 2 participants in the trans-
actions as contemplated. In the standard transaction used here for
comparison, the overriding royalty interest overrides all proceeds
rights of the driller. By sharp contrast, the contemplated transactions
will produce an override only as to the carried working interest of the
Group 1 participants. In subordinating the proceeds rights of the
Group 1 participants, the override of the Group 2 participants
achieves priority equal to the driller's proceeds rights after payout,
but no more.
This line of critical inquiry thus makes the same mistake which is
made by arguing that the iter se transaction preceded the initial
transaction. Furthermore, the attack could also be faulted for ignor-
ing the actions of the parties. Comparison of the contemplated trans-
actions with the alternative standard transaction does have initial
superficial appeal, but it simply does not withstand critical analysis.
Simply ignoring the two transactions which do occur will not work.
Rather, the Service will have to seek to integrate the two transactions.
Thus, were the Service to attack, one can count on it to point to the
combination of capital gain treatment claimed by persons who retain
only an overriding interest. But an attack based solely on these
grounds should fail because the capital gain treatment and the reten-
tion of only an overriding royalty interest occur in separate transac-
tions. To base the attack on other grounds will require claiming that
the separateness of the transactions lacks economic reality. This has
already been addressed.
E. Particular Partnership Considerations
The two most important issues addressed in this article, the tax
effect of the inter se transaction itself and, the more important of the
two, the effect of the inter se transaction on the cash received up front
in the initial transaction, are most clearly raised in the framework of
the partnership form. In fact, if ever litigated, the partnership form
would almost certainly be involved.
Particular partnership considerations are not the major concern,
however, and the tax issues discussed transcend the particular form.
The discussion therefore intentionally looks past business form to the
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underlying substantive issues. Tax considerations of the partnership
form which are routine in the context of limited partnership lease
fund transactions will not be discussed. 1 5 Having dealt with some of
the structural peculiarities of an oil and gas lease fund limited part-
nership, 1 6 some tax considerations raised by the underlying transac-
tions which are both unusual for transactions of this type and
peculiar to the particular business form of the limited partnership will
now be considered.
Acquisition of the lease, engagment of the driller and creation of
the carried/carrying working interest relationship fit within the nor-
mal range of oil and gas limited partnership activities and do not
raise unusual tax complications. The inter se transaction is unusual.
Effecting it through the partnership form therefore raises issues not
commonly found in limited partnership lease fund transactions in the
industry.
There are two distinctly different ways of placing the Group 2
participants, in their capacity as limited partners, in the ultimate po-
sition described above. A distribution of overriding royalty rights
could be made in complete liquidation of the partnership interest of
each Group 2 participant. Alternatively, the distributive shares of the
Group 1 and Group 2 partners in profits and losses could be altered
by amending the partnership agreement.
Distribution of overriding royalty rights made in complete liqui-
dation of the partnership interests of the Group 2 partners would in-
volve creating the overriding royalty interest they must receive. It
would be tantamount to a nonproportional distribution of assets be-
cause of the smaller proceeds rights which inhere in an overriding
royalty interest. The distributions would be free and clear of respon-
sibility for costs, which would be picked up completely by the Group
1 partners, who would then be the only limited partners left. There is
little reason for persons with only overriding rights, free of costs, to
remain in the partnership. The feeling should be mutual. Such dis-
tributions of overriding royalty interest are not recognition events for
the Group 2 individuals. 117
Amendment of the partnership agreement altering the distribu-
tive shares of the Group 1 and Group 2 partners in the profits and
115. For a discussion of the tax considerations relevant to the choice of organiza-
tional form for natural resource ventures, see Burke & Meyer, Federal Income Tax Clas-
sification of Natural Resource Ventures. Co-Ownershz , Partnershtip, or Association?, 37 Sw.
LJ. 859 (1984).
116. For a discussion of the structure of the limited partnership, see note 10 and
accompanying text supra.
117. See I.R.C. § 731(a) (1982).
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losses of the partnership would create an overriding position in the
Group 2 partners if for some reason it were considered desirable for
the partners to stay together. The Group 1 partners would get all the
profits in excess of the overriding royalty and would be made respon-
sbile for all future contributions to the partnership necessary to cover
the limited partners' responsibility for costs. The Group 1 rights to
this larger share of profits would thereby be subordinated to the re-
duced share of profits of the Group 2 partners. The rights of the
Group 2 partners would amount to rights to a share of gross revenues
since any costs or expenses would have to be borne by the Group 1
partners out of whatever revenues are left. It is contemplated that all
monies previously contributed to the partnership would already have
been used for acquisition of the lease (or leases) or for expenses inci-
dent thereto. The Group 2 partners will then be left with no rights to
any future distributions of property from the partnership other than
those distributions attributable to their override. The Group 1 part-
ners, including the general partner, will have a distributive share
among them of 100% of losses and all deductible items which reduce
profits or contribute to losses, with the single exception of depletion.
The Group 2 partners will have the rights to depletion which attend
their share of proceeds rights. The law generally does allow contrac-
tual variation in items of income, loss or deduction. 18 The rear-
rangement of rights within the partnership by amendment of the
partnership agreement is not conceptually different from any other
such modification, whether orginally contemplated or accomplished
by amendment. That these changes are not themselves recognition
events, except under certain circumstances involving changes in the
share of liabilities of particular partners, does not appear to have been
questioned. This result is consistent, as it should be, with the first
alternative: the distribution of an overriding royalty interest in com-
plete liquidation of a partner's interest. The position of the Group 2
partners who remain in the partnership is not substantively different
from what it would have been if they had opted out.
That a shift in the partners' shares of liabilities could be a recog-
nition event deserves special comment. The potential problem is that
just as an increase in a partner's share of liabilities is treated as a
contribution of money, 19 so also a decrease in a partner's share of
liabilities is treated as a distribution of money. 120 Any distribution of
money in excess of a partner's adjusted basis in his partnership inter-
118. See id § 704(a).
119. See id. § 752(a).
120. See id. § 752(b).
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est would be recognized.1 2 1 This is a potential difficulty for the
Group 2 partners whether or not they stay in the partnership. It
should not, however, be a difficulty here because the responsibility for
future costs is not yet a liability and it may never become one. 122 It is
contingent and its quantity is impossible to calculate.
VI. POLICY DIMENSIONS
The social policy dimensions of federal income taxation law are
important in determining what the law is and how it is to be applied.
Congress has made a policy determination that "income"is not neces-
sarily "income," since not all income is taxed.123 For income which is
taxed, there are two fundamentally different ways of taxing it. In
case of an individual, if income qualifies as long-term capital gain,
then only forty percent of the income is taxed.' 24 The other kind of
income is appropriately called ordinary income 2 5 because the exclu-
sion of sixty percent of long-term capital gain from the basic taxing
mechanisms is truly extraordinary. The wisdom of such a bifurcation
of income has been commented upon frequently. 26 The wisdom of a
bifurcation which manifests itself in the manner of the present capital
gains provisions has also been the focus of considerable comment. 27
121. See id § 731(a)(1).
122. See, e.g., Long v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 1 (1978), modified, 81-2 U.S. Tax
Cas. (CCH) 9668 (10th Cir. 1981); Associated Patentees, Inc., 4 T.C. 979 (1945).
See also W. MCKEE, W. NELSON & R. WHITMIRE, FEDERAL TAXATION OF PART-
NERSHIPS AND PARTNERS 7.01 (1978). Cf CRC Corp. v. Commissioner, 693 F.2d
281 (3d Cir. 1982); Brountas v. Commissioner, 692 F.2d 152 (1st Cir. 1982), cert. de-
nied, 103 S. Ct. 2453 (1983); Zappo v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 77 (1983); Denver &
Rio Grande W. R.R. v. United States, 505 F.2d 1266 (Ct. Cl. 1974); Gibson Prods.
Co. v. United States, 460 F. Supp. 1109 (N.D. Tex. 1978), af'd, 637 F.2d 1041 (5th
Cir. 1981). For a discussion of the contingent nature of the debt, see note 87 and
accompanying text supra.
123. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 101-132 (1982).
124. Id § 1202(a). The minimum tax provisions may, of course, apply. See id.
§§ 55-58.
125. See, e.g., id § 64 ("the term '[o]rdinary income' includes any gain from the
sale or exchange of property which is neither a capital asset nor property described in
§ 1231(b)").
126. Income Tax Revision." Hearings, Before the House Comm. on Ways & Means, 86th
Cong., 1st Sess. 13-14 (1959) (testimony of Walter J. Blum) [hereinafter cited as Tes-
timony of W. Blum]; H. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION: THE DEFINITION
OF INCOME AS A PROBLEM OF FISCAL POLICY 148-68 (1980); Blum, A Handy Summary
of the Capital Gains Arguments, 35 TAXES 247 (1957); Katsoris, In Defense of Capital Gains,
42 FORDHAM L. REV. 1 (1973); Waggoner, Eliminating the Capital Gains Preference Part
P. The Problem ofInflation, Bunching, and Lock-in, 48 U. Co.o. L. REV. 313 (1977) [here-
inafter cited as Waggoner, Part I]; Waggoner, Ehminating the Capital Gains Preference.
Part II" The Problem of Corporate Taxation, 49 U. Coi.o. L. REV. 9 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as Waggoner, Part Il].
127. Income Tax Revision: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Ways & Means, 86th
Cong., 1st Sess. 675-78 (1959) (testimony of Stanley S. Surrey) [hereinafter cited as
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The basic idea and the particular manifestation are both subject to
attack. These attacks take the form of policy arguments to repeal the
bifurcation 28 or to change its particulars.1 29 They also take the form
of policy arguments to interpret narrowly the applicability of the cap-
ital gains provisions when their application is not appropriate in view
of the policies underlying the provisions.13o
1959 testimony of S. Surrey]; General Revenue Revision. Hearings Before the House Comm.
on Ways &Means, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 2281-91 (1958) (testimony of Stanley S. Sur-
rey) [hereinafter cited as 1958 testimony of S. Surrey]; Brinner, Inflation, Deferral and
the Neutral Taxation of Capital Gains, 26 NAT'i. TAX J. 565 (1973); Katcher, A Critique of
Capital Gains Taxation Problems and Proposals, 14 U.S. CAl.. TAX INST. 769 (1962);
Rockier, Frolics and Detours in Capital Gains, 41 TAXES 858 (1963); Tudor, Exemption of
Capital Gains from the Capital Gains Tax, 35 TAXES 101 (1957) [hereinafter cited as
Tudor, Exemption]; Tudor, The Equitable Justifcatonfor the Capital Gains Tax, 34 TAXEs
643 (1956) [hereinafter cited as Tudor, Justication]; Note, A Spreading of Receipts
Formula for Creating A Capital Gains/Ordinagy Income Brightline: Contract Termination Pay-
ments and Business- Versus-Investment Assets, 87 YALE L.J. 729 (1978).
128. See Testimony of W. Blum, supra note 127, at 13-14; Waggoner, Part I, supra
note 126, at 313; Waggoner, Part II, supra note 126, at 9.
129. See 1959 testimony of S. Surrey, supra note 127, at 675-78; 1958 testimony of
S. Surrey, supra note 127, at 2281-91; Brinner, supra note 127, at 565; Katcher, supra
note 127, at 769; Tudor, Exemption, supra note 127, at 101; Tudor, justification, supra
note 127, at 643; Note, supra note 127.
130. An example of such narrow interpretations can be seen in the use of the
word "property" in certain tax applications. See generally I.R.C. § 1221 (1982) (defini-
tion of "capital asset"). While the word "property" has an ordinary, everyday mean-
ing, that meaning is often irrelevant in tax applications. Some items which are
property in the normal sense are excluded from this tax meaning of property. For
specific examples of this phenomenon, see Commissioner v. P.G. Lake, Inc., 356 U.S.
260, 264-67 (1958) (oil payment rights); Corn Prods. Refining Co. v. Commissioner,
350 U.S. 46, 50-51 (1955) (corn futures); Hort v. Commissioner, 313 U.S. 28, 31
(1941) (an unexpired lease). Another obvious example is the right to receive wages.
These items are excluded from the meaning of the word property here, even though
they are not in a list of five exceptions provided by the Internal Revenue Code. See
I.R.C. § 1221 (1982); Commissioner v. Gillette Motor Transport, 364 U.S. 130
(1960). Statutorily, a "capital asset" is "property held by the taxpayer," subject to
five exceptions. I.R.C. § 1221(l)-(5) (1982). In its interpretation of this section, the
Supreme Court has held that "capital asset," and by implication "property," must
"be construed narrowly in accordance with the purpose of Congress to afford capital
gain treatment only in situations typically involving the realization of apprecication
in value accrued over a substantial period of time, and thus, to ameliorate the hard-
ship of taxation of the entire gain in one year." Commissioner v. Gillette Motor
Transport, 364 U.S. 130, 134,(1960) (citing Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103, 106
(1932)). See generally Surrey, Definitional Problems in Capital Gains Taxation, 69 HARv. L.
REV. 985, 987-89 (1956). The opportunity for special interpretation of the meaning
of "property" in § 1221 for policy reasons is more striking when compared to much
broader interpretation of the same word for purposes of installment sales under the
tax law. See Realty Loan Corp. v. Commissioner, 478 F.2d 1049 (9th Cir. 1973). In
Realty Loan, the Commissioner argued that the contract rights would not be "prop-
erty" for purposes of achieving capital gain treatment, and that they therefore could
not be property for purposes of achieving installment sale treatment. Id. at 1050-5 1.
The circuit court pointed out that the capital gain meaning of "property" turned on
the special congressional purpose in enacting the capital gains provisions and that
this purpose was absent in the installment sale area. Id. at 1051. It stated that the
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Assuming the existence of only the initial transaction, without
the inter se transaction, the following arguments can be made in favor
of capital gain treatment. The property rights sold are distinguish-
able in nature from labor provided, and from property sold in the
ordinary course of a trade or business. :"I By contrast, in the initial
transaction there is a one-time, or only occasional, sale of a fractional
interest in accumulated capital.
The invested capital has been held for what is referred to as a
long period of time (over six months)., 32 The gain recognized all at
once at the time of disposition therefore represents appreciation in
value which has occurred over a long period of time. Recognition all
at once unfairly bunches the income into higher rate brackets than
income realized more evenly over time from wages or from sales in
the ordinary course of a trade or business. During the past twelve
years the oil and gas industry has been subjected to particularly vola-
tile price and cost increases. The bunching argument applies here,
therefore, with particular force.
Because the appreciation has occurred over an extended time pe-
riod, it is partially attributable to inflation. Inflationary gain is not
real gain. To tax it is therefore to tax a return of capital. This, it is
maintained, is not only bad policy but possibly impermissible under
the sixteenth amendment. 3 3 If it is taxation of a return of capital, it
is certainly not theoretically pleasing for a tax which is called an "in-
come tax."
Leaving more capital in the hands of investors by taxing them
less will stimulate the economy. This is thought to happen for a
number of reasons. More capital is left in the hands of those who
have a demonstrated ability to manage capital and to do so profita-
definition of "property" for purposes of § 1221 is suigeners. Id. (citing Commissioner
v. Gillette Motor Transport, 364 U.S. 130 (1960)). By contrast, the court held that
for purposes of the installment sales provisions, "property" retains its "natural and
normal meaning." d. at 1052.
131. Stock in trade, property properly includable in inventory, and property
held primarily for sale in the ordinary course of business are specifically excluded
from the definition of "capital asset" in § 1221. See I.R.C. § 1221(1) (1982); id.
§ 1231(b)(1)(A), (b)(1)(B) (inventory excluded from meaning of property used in
trade or business). However, working interests, or portions thereof, would not be
stock in trade unless the holder of the interest regularly engaged in the sale of work-
ing interests. Cf id. § 1236 (relating to gain from sale or exchange of asset held by
dealers in securities).
132. See Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 1001, 98 Stat. 494,
1011, reprinted :i' 6A 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEws (amending 26 U.S.C.
§ 1222). This act reduced the holding period required to earn long-term capital gain
treatment from "more than one year" to "more than six months." Compare id. wlth 26
U.S.C. § 1222(a) (1982).
133. See Waggoner, Part I, supra note 126, at 335-62, 375-78.
1088 [Vol. 29: p. 1047
42
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 5 [1984], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol29/iss5/1
1983-84] OIL AND GAS LEASE TRANSACTION 1089
bly. Ameliorating the tax impact of a capital gain transaction in-
creases the mobility of capital out of unprofitable or less profitable
economic sectors and into those which are more profitable. Similarly,
within particular economic sectors, capital gain treatment enhances
the ability to move cash out of unprofitable or less profitable invest-
ments and into those offering greater profitability. The end result is
increased efficiency, both in the economy as a whole and in particular
sectors of the economy.
The applicable classification provisions state that the property
rights sold are property within the meaning of section 1221 and either
do not fall within its five exceptions13 4 or can be classified as real
property used in a trade or business." -' Either way, the same tax re-
sult follows on sale at a gain. If the property is a capital asset, the
gain is capital gain. If the property is not a capital asset because it is
property used in a trade or business, then section 1231 provides that
gain from its sale or exchange will be treated as capital gain any-
way. 13 1 All of this follows because what is parted with is a share of
invested capital. The transaction does not occur in the ordinary
course of a trade or business.
These factors favor special taxation treatment in order to en-
courage investment in the capital stock of America. They are partic-
ularly applicable when the highly risky quest for new oil and gas
reserves is involved." 7 The classic capital gain transaction involves
134. I.R.C. § 1221(l)-(5) (1982). The five exceptions include: (1) inventory or
stock in the taxpayer's trade or business; (2) depreciable or real property used in the
trade or business; (3) a copyright or similar asset; (4) accounts or notes receivable
which were acquired in the course of the trade or business; and (5) publications of the
United States government. Id
135. See Spragins, Jr. v. United States, 78-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9,475 (N.D.
Tex. 1978); Colman v. United States, 62-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9,241 (D. Utah
1961); Sledge v. United States, 56-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 10,033 (N.D. Tex. 1956).
As long as the transferor is not a dealer, a working interest is characterized as "real
property" used in a trade or business within the meaning of§ 1221 and § 1231. Rev.
Rul. 226, 1968-1 C.B. 362; A. BRUEN & W. TAYLOR, supra note 12, 8.04[2](a). See
also Rev. Rul. 395, 1977-2 C.B. 80.
136. I.R.C. § 1231 (1982), amended by Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-369, § 1001(b)(15), 98 Stat. 494, 1011-12, reprintedm 6A 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
Ai). NEWS.
137. The risk is not limited to the inability to predict whether oil or gas will be
found in a particular well in meaningful quantities. For instance, the price of a bar-
rel of crude oil is very significant in determining whether or not particular oil quanti-
ties are economic quantities. Drake's first oil sold for one dollar per gallon. A. CONE
& W. JOHNS, PETRO.IA 14 (1870). Two years later the going rate was fifteen cents
per barrel. Id. During this time small ventures in the Titusville area ceased opera-
tions. d. During 1982 and through mid-1983 the price per barrel fell over 14% and
many smaller oil companies were forced to declare bankruptcy. Back to Reah'tyfor the
Ol Indusry, U.S. NEWS & WORi.i REP., Mar. 14, 1983, at 21. Those that avoided
bankruptcy did so by laying off virtually all employees. Id. at 22. Thus, novel ap-
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the sale of corporate stock, 13 8 which is normally much more readily
marketable than oil and gas properties. '" The latter will more fre-
quently have to be disposed of at times and prices for which their
owner must be more flexible. 140 If the foregoing policy objectives are
achieved when only the inital transaction is involved, they are no less
achieved when the inler se transaction is added.
In a classic capital gain transaction, the sale of corporate stock, it
would not normally occur to the Service to look to see what the seller
did with additional stock in a second transaction in order to deter-
mine the appropriate characterization of the first transaction. The
presence of an unrelated buyer of the stock may be all that is needed
to give the first stock sale economic reality. 14' The second transaction
is only relevant to the first if the transactions are not viewed as sepa-
rate, a dimension already addressed.' 42 Otherwise, the tendency is, if
anything, to the contrary. The first transaction profitably informs an
understanding of how to treat the second, not vice versa.
143
Nevertheless, the special capital gain taxation received by the
Group 2 participants is somehow troubling. The following factors ar-
gue against capital gain treatment for the Group 2 participants under
the contemplated transactions.
The difference between selling the property rights involved here
and providing labor for wages is a distinction which depends on
wealth. Only the wealthy are in a position to enter into this combina-
tion of transactions.
Ongoing sales of property in the ordinary course of a trade or
business involve the use of invested capital. Even routine sales of in-
ventory are sales of capital in an economic sense. In the economic
division between capital and labor, it is clear that a sale from inven-
tory is not purely a sale of labor. Yet gain from these arguably simi-
lar transactions does not get favorable capital gain treatment, 44 even
when the gain is uneven over time.
The long-term capital gain holding period, six months and a
proaches in obtaining the tax benefits intentionally conferred by Congress are neces-
sary if the discovery rate for new domestic crude oil and gas reserves is not to remain
very low for some period of time.
138. See I SURREY, supra note 106, at 992-93.
139. See A. BRUEN & W. TAYIOR, supra note 12, 8.04, at 8-16.
140. Id.
141. See 2 SURREY, supra note 106, at 675-78. Cf I.R.C. § 1239 (1982) (transac-
tions between related taxpayers).
142. See text following note 103 supra.
143. See, e.g., Arrowsmith v. Commissioner, 344 U.S. 6 (1952).
144. See I.R.C. § 1221(l) (1982).
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day, is not sufficiently long to assure that the income is truly bunched.
It may be that six months' income is bunched in one day, but that
does not place the recipient in a higher tax bracket than he would be
in if the same six months' income had been earned evenly over a year.
And a capital gain transaction entered into once every six months can
produce an income flow that is quite level over a period of years, even
when the asset sold in each transaction has been held for many years.
The argument that bunching does not justify special treatment
applies with particular force to the classic capital gain transaction,
the sale of corporate stock. Stock ownership is readily divisible by
selling only some of the shares owned. Shares of stock of the same
class in the same company are fungible. People can and do sell shares
of stock once a year, or more often, thereby obtaining a regular, even
flow of income which is treated as capital gain.
Moreover, the income averaging provisions, sections 1301-1305,
are designed to ameliorate any hardship caused by bunching.1
4 5
While these provisions would be available if special treatment for
captial gain were removed from the code, they are presently also
available for any significant bunching caused by inclusion of the forty
percent capital gain left after the sixty percent long-term capital gain
deduction is taken. If bunching is a problem, a solution which says
that sixty percent of the income is not income at all is as crude a
solution as is imaginable.
The brevity of the long-term capital gain holding period, partic-
ularly in the context of different rates of inflation in different sectors
of the economy and even for different products in the same market
sector, does not assure that any significant inflation gain will be re-
flected in the amount realized on sale of particular assets.' 46
It may be true that some economic stimulation results from tax-
ing capital gain favorably, but the means of accomplishing this are
government subsidies for the wealthier members of society.
The problems with these and other arguments against capital
gain treatment for the Group 2 participants is that they apply equally
to all persons who engage only in the initial transaction. The objec-
tions to capital gain treatment for the Group 2 participants, while
wholly legitimate, are therefore really arguments to repeal the bifur-
cated treatment of income or to change the particulars of the bifurca-
145. Id. §§ 1301-1305.
146. However, increases in taxes resulting from being pushed into higher rate
brackets by inflation are somewhat alleviated by adjustments to the tax tables to
reflect inflation. See id § l(f).
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tion. They are not grounds for singling out the Group 2 participants
for loss of the special benefits.
VII. CONCLUSION
The structural variation on the standard oil and gas industry
model for limited partnership lease fund transactions that has been
analyzed in this article is but another way in which the standard
transaction may evolve. The investors' opportunity for additional
flexibility in the manner of achieving capital gain treatment, while at
the same time repositioning themselves in a less risky position, is an
attraction which can lure more capital into the industry. It will cer-
tainly leave more capital in the hands of those who have shown an
inclination to invest in the industry.
In the structural variation, an investor seeks to obtain capital
gain treatment for an initial cash payment while ending up with an
overriding royalty interest. He does so by keeping separate, in two
transactions, the means of achieving each. In the initial transaction,
capital gain is sought by selling for cash a fractional share of what is a
capital gain asset-a working interest. The investor then transforms
his working interest into what was a lesser-included interest, a royalty
interest. He does this by transferring a fraction of his right to receive
proceeds to other owners of the working interest who, in return, take
over his responsibility for costs.
If the necessary transactions are structured in the manner dis-
cussed herein, then there are substantial economic realities which at-
tend the transactions. These economic realities argue strongly in
favor of recognizing the separateness of the transactions for purposes
of federal taxation law. 147 The cash received up front in the initial
transaction with the driller should therefore be considered capital
gain to Group 2 participants.
Thus, the contemplated combination of transactions should be
viewed as a creative means of obtaining for the oil and gas industry
the special benefits intentionally conferred by Congress, rather than
as an abusive manipulation of the taxing mechanisms. If the result is
undesirable on tax policy or other grounds, then it can be deemed one
147. Firm conclusions in this area are difficult to reach. Many decisions in re-
cent years have wrestled with the issue of whether what appears a sale should be
treated as a lease, with clear criteria having yet to be developed. See Mandel &
Marlo, Mineral Properties-Exploration, Acquisition, Development and Disposition, 15-5th
TAX MGMT. (BNA) PORTFOLIOS (1981). It is common for courts to look through
transactions cast in the form of sales to find leases. See generally Schmid, Economic and
Nonoperating Mineral Interests, 151-2d TAX MGMT. (BNA) (1980). The problem is ex-
acerbated when transactions include new twists.
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more minor addition to the list of undesirable results which flow from
the present capital gain provisions. The argument, however, should
focus on changing the provisions, not excluding the proposed transac-
tions from capital gains treatment.
It remains to be seen whether the oil and gas industry will at-
tempt the restructured combined transactions. The attractions may
prove too tempting not to try. If so, it will be only a matter of time to
see whether judicial concurrence follows.
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